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Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court has employed various mechanisms to blunt the systemic
impact of legal change. The Warren Court balanced the interests advanced by new rules against
the disruption of their retroactive application and frequently limited new rules to prospective
effect. The Rehnquist Court decisively rejected this approach in the mid-1990s and committed
itself to full adjudicative retroactivity as to pending cases. This Article argues that, although
the Court slammed a door, it subsequently opened a window. The Court has spent the
intervening decades devising ostensibly independent and unrelated doctrines to mitigate
disruption. Despite the Rehnquist Court’s insistence that these doctrines do not relate to
retroactivity, they reflect the same balance and, in almost every case, yield the same results as
Warren-era balancing. This Article makes the descriptive case that the balancing of interests
has survived intact and the normative case that finding a mechanism for softening the blow of
legal change promotes respect for existing rules and the Court’s institutional legitimacy.
Finally, this Article explores how the Court’s sub silentio balancing is likely to play out in the
next big retroactivity challenge, the Appointments Clause context post-Lucia v. SEC.
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INTRODUCTION
The Warren Court’s practice of issuing opinions with prospective effect
is dead. Or is it? In an effort to blunt the disruptive effects of legal change,
the freewheeling, rights-generating Warren Court often made new rules
with prospective effect or effect limited to the prevailing litigants.1 Thus,

1. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 674–75 (1971) (declining retroactive effect of
the rule allowing a Fifth Amendment defense against compelled production of tax returns); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299–301 (1967) (limiting retroactive effect of the right to counsel for postindictment lineups); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627–29 (1965) (limiting retroactive effect of
the exclusionary rule). For purposes of this analysis, “pure” prospectivity means the new rule applies
only to conduct arising in the future; “selective” prospectivity means the Court applies the new rule
to the litigants in the case in which it announces the rule but does not allow its application to other
pending cases. During the Warren era, the Court generally preferred selective prospectivity. But see
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the protections of Miranda v. Arizona,2 the right to counsel at preindictment lineups,3 the narrowed scope of searches incident to arrest in
Chimel v. California,4 and rules barring the imposition of harsher
sentences after successful appeal5 supplied a victory to the named and
future defendants but did not confer benefits on other litigants in the
pipeline—either those similarly situated on direct appeal or those whose
cases were already final. The Court rationalized this practice in cases like
Linkletter v. Walker6 and Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson7 by candidly
considering the potential systemic impact of its holdings, differentiating
between mere procedural or prophylactic rules, as to which the balance
favored prospective effect,8 and rules going to our confidence in the
underlying determination of guilt or innocence, as to which the balance
favored retroactivity.9
After a series of fits and starts, and as the Warren Court faded in the
rearview, Griffith v. Kentucky10 and Harper v. Virginia Department of
Taxation11 shut the door on this practice of according decisions
prospective or selectively prospective effect, establishing emphatically
that prospective rulemaking is inconsistent with the judicial function.12
Since the mid-1990s, then, adjudicative retroactivity has been our
accepted norm. A new principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court
is immediately effective in other pending cases, even as to events

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972) (setting up new rules the regarding revocation of
parole “which are applicable to future revocations”).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. The Court recognized this right in two companion cases, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
4. 392 U.S. 752 (1969).
5. The Court recognized this right in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
6. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
7. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 253–54 (1969) (declining retroactivity of the
rule that the Fourth Amendment applies even without physical trespass); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719, 730–33 (1966) (declining retroactivity for Miranda).
9. See, e.g., Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294–95 (1968) (requiring retroactive effect of Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which barred admission of a co-defendant’s confession
implicating the defendant because the error went to guilt or innocence); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968) (indicating the rule barring a death-certified jury in capital cases goes “to
the very integrity . . . of the process” and would have full retroactive effect (citation omitted)).
10. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
11. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
12. See id. at 97; Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
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predating its formulation.13 Whether motivated by Article III-based
antipathy to advisory opinions14 or by a post-Warren Court aversion to
rights-generation, these cases mandated that the full consequences of any
new rule be borne widely and immediately—at least in non-final cases—
without regard to whether the rule was foreseeable, wrought major
change, or gave rise to unfair consequences.15 The Court has resisted bald
efforts to circumvent this regime. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde16
avowed that Harper was to have more than “symbolic significance,”
unanimously rejecting a litigant’s effort to reinsert balancing of fairness
and reliance interests by way of a remedial inquiry.17
That door firmly shut, we officially no longer balance. But the Court
has spent the past couple of decades comfortably deploying a variety of
doctrines to blunt the impact of new rules, and its patchwork of ostensibly
unrelated devices brings many of the selfsame considerations that were in
play during the Warren era back in through a window.18 Where a plaintiff
seeks damages from official actors, those officers enjoy immunity for all
but violations of “clearly established” rules of which they should have
been aware.19 In other words, a plaintiff cannot benefit from a new rule to
obtain compensation for injuries suffered at the hands of a state or federal
officer. So, too, a criminal defendant cannot claim “retroactivity” to
obtain the benefit of any new rule in the Fourth Amendment context, for
13. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (“When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before
it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in
all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or
postdate our announcement of the rule.”); Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 (“We therefore hold that a new
rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes
a ‘clear break’ with the past.”).
14. Strong hostility to advisory opinions, tethered to the nature of the judicial power and reflected
in Article III, emerged almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution. See Letter from John
Jay, Chief Justice, and Associate Justices, to George Washington, President of the United States (Aug.
8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488–89 (Henry P. Johnston
ed., 1891) (rejecting Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson’s request for “extra-judicial” advice on the
construction of a treaty). It has been “an uncontroversial and central element of our understanding of
federal judicial power” since. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 50 (7th ed. 2015).
15. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97; Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
16. 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
17. Id. at 754. See generally Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65
UCLA L. REV. 808, 832–43 (2018) (describing the Rehnquist Court’s decisive rejection of selective
and, implicitly, pure prospectivity).
18. See generally Toby J. Heytens, The Framework(s) of Legal Change, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 595,
599 (2012) [hereinafter Heytens, The Framework(s)] (observing that “courts have at their disposal
multiple strategies for limiting the disruptive effects of law-changing decisions”).
19. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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officers are allowed to rely in good-faith on old rules, adjudicative
retroactivity principles notwithstanding.20 The Court has employed the
doctrine of forfeiture to bar criminal defendants on direct appeal from
taking advantage of many new rules when they failed to object at trial,
even when those new rules were unforeseeable and foreclosed by thenexisting precedent.21 The Court has laid out a blueprint for states to avoid
tax refund liability, thus softening adjudicative retroactivity’s blow
considerably.22
These various doctrines, the Court has instructed, are unrelated to
adjudicative retroactivity.23 However, the circumstances of their creation
reflect concern for the same issues of fairness, reliance, and institutional
legitimacy—and the same assessment of the underlying importance of the
right enjoyed—that were motivating factors during the ancien regime.
This Article examines the hodgepodge of seemingly unrelated doctrines
that work to alleviate the disruptive consequences of judicial change
through the lens of Linkletter and Huson. It seeks to demonstrate that, just
as in the pre-Griffith and Harper era, the Court has consistently given
weight to the fairness of subjecting litigants to rules that unforeseeably
arose after the activities that gave rise to suit. With few exceptions, the
areas in which the Court has comfortably permitted retroactivity are areas
in which the Court perceives the newly-recognized right to be significant
enough to outweigh reliance interests. Conversely, when a new rule either
serves as a prophylactic or advances aims only tangentially related to the
claimant, the Court has scrutinized reliance and systemic effects of
retroactive application and has not hesitated to recognize other and socalled “distinct” doctrines that block its operation.24 This Article makes
the descriptive case that balancing survived the Rehnquist Court’s
repudiation of the Linkletter/Huson regime mostly intact. It then makes
the normative case that even if the Court’s efforts lack transparency, a
20. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243–45 (2011).
21. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–70 (1997) (undertaking forfeiture analysis
when the defendant had not objected at trial to the judge’s determination of materiality, even though
the Supreme Court had not required that juries decide the question until after the conclusion of
defendant’s trial). See generally Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal
Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 925–28 (2006) [hereinafter Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments]
(noting the Court’s use of forfeiture to minimize disruption of legal change and arguing for a return
to selective prospectivity).
22. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993).
23. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1995) (describing these various
doctrines that thwart retroactive application of new rules as “special circumstance[s]” supported by
different, “well-established legal reasons”); Davis, 564 U.S. at 243–45 (noting that the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule and retroactivity are “two distinct doctrines”).
24. Davis, 564 U.S. at 243.
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balancing regime is a good thing both for institutional legitimacy and for
systemic fairness.
Finally, this Article examines the next frontier where the Court may be
inclined to improvise a “separate”25 doctrine to blunt the impact of legal
change: structural challenges under the Appointments Clause.
Appointments Clause challenges have peppered the Court’s docket in the
last few years.26 Thus far, these challenges have threatened little
disruption, with few more than a handful of other cases affected by the
Court’s opinions invalidating the appointment of challenged officers.27
This is likely to change, as the Court’s most recent decision invalidating
the appointment of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
administrative law judges in Lucia v. SEC28 is likely to have spillover
effects in areas with much greater likelihood of disruption.29 If an invalid
appointment affects too many pending cases, there may be renewed calls
for some mechanism to blunt the impact of separation of powers rulings,
particularly where retroactive application may jeopardize thousands of
cases in the pipeline.30
This Article finds ample room in the balancing of interests the Court
has undertaken both before and after the Linkletter/Huson regime to
minimize disruption occasioned by the Court’s more structural,
separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Because the interests of individual
litigants raising Appointments Clause challenges are so modest that the
25. Id.
26. See Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE
L.J. 1607, 1608 (2015) (“The federal appointments process is having its proverbial day in the sun.”).
27. See infra notes 371–372 and accompanying text.
28. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
29. See, e.g., Case Comment, Article II – Appointments Clause – Officers of the United States: Lucia v.
SEC, 132 HARV. L. REV. 287, 291 (2018) (“The holding of Lucia has modest implications for the SEC, but it
threatens to alter drastically the workings of other agencies, especially the Social Security Administration
(SSA).”); Jeffrey McCoy & Oliver Dunford, Symposium: The Future of the Appointments Clause,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 21, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-the-future-ofthe-appointments-clause [https://perma.cc/SR9Y-JAEE] (“There are over 1,300 ALJs dispersed over 30
federal agencies. Many of these ALJs are ‘near-carbon copies’ of the SEC’s ALJs, who preside over
adversarial hearings, take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence and have the power
to enforce compliance with discovery orders.”). The Fifth Circuit has also flagged the resemblance between
SEC administrative law judges (ALJs) and FDIC ALJs. See Burgess v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 871 F.3d 297,
301–03 (5th Cir. 2017) (likening FDIC ALJs to tax court special trial judges held to be inferior officers in
Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), and holding that the appellant had made
a “strong showing” of likely success on his Appointments Clause challenge). But see Landry v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 204 F.3d 1125, 1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that FDIC ALJs are not inferior officers).
30. Although the Court rejected application of the de facto doctrine in Ryder v. United States, 515
U.S. 177 (1995), it did so primarily because the defective appointments at issue required reversal of
only seven to ten other cases. Id. at 184–85. See infra notes 369–373 and accompanying text.
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Court is often at pains to incentivize these claims, there is little risk that
failing to accord an Appointments Clause holding retroactive effect will
give rise to injustice. At the same time, the input on the other side of the
scale—potentially massive disruption—may make the benefits of
anything but prospective relief pale in comparison. This Article argues
that the Court’s precedents support carving out another exception to the
generally prevailing norm of adjudicative retroactivity; although it is a
central conceit that in doing so, the Court would be undertaking the same
exercise it has pursued, albeit rather stealthily, for half a century and
counting.
Part I looks at the Linkletter/Huson regime and the development of
adjudicative retroactivity under Griffith and Harper, paying special
attention to what factors inclined the Court to prospectivity in the Warren
era and to what the Rehnquist Court rejected and why. 31 Part II surveys
the patchwork of doctrines that currently prevent application of new rules
to pending cases and examines in each case who suffers harm either from
the application of the new rule or from the refusal to accord it retroactive
effect.32 This Part concludes that virtually every case makes sense given
the Court’s understanding of relative harms and systemic impacts—in
other words, nearly every case is explainable on the basis of sub silentio
consideration of the same factors that held sway in the days before Griffith
and Harper. It then considers the normative implications of backdoor
balancing and concludes that, while greater transparency might be
optimal, and while the official rejection of Linkletter/Huson may be more
aspirational than actual, consideration of fairness and systemic impacts
enhances the legitimacy of the federal courts. Finally, Part III takes these
insights and applies them to the context of the Appointments Clause,
examining how the Court is likely to heed the next call to moderate the
effects of its handiwork.33 It goes on to demonstrate that the Court’s steady
impulse to upset reliance interests only where the interests are strong and
the disruption relatively modest, combined with its precedents in this area
to date, should give rise to a reasonable, de facto validity accommodation
that reflects impulses entirely consistent with those obtained in the
Linkletter/Huson era.
I.

ADJUDICATIVE RETROACTIVITY AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

To understand where the Court is today, it is necessary to examine three
eras of retroactivity: (A) the pre-Warren era, under which retroactive
31. See discussion infra Part I.
32. See discussion infra Part II.
33. See discussion infra Part III.
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application of new rules was the norm; (B) the Linkletter/Huson balancing
era that prevailed from 1965 to the early 1990s, during which the Court
permitted prospective and selective prospective judicial rulemaking; and
(C) the Harper/Griffith era that ensued, during which the Court brought
itself back—at least on the books—to a no-balancing norm, according
retrospective effect to its decisions in all non-final cases.
A.

A Thousand Years of Presumed Retroactivity

Before the 1960s, the application of new legal rules to other pending
cases was generally presumed.34 Retroactive application had its origins in
the common law and reflected a Blackstonian conception that judges did
not make law; rather, they found it.35 As such, there was no concept of
“new” rules. A rule announced in any case predated its official recognition
(in some metaphysical sense). The “old,” now-discredited rule was a
“failure at true discovery” that consequently is not now and never had
been the law.36
The unquestioned retroactive application of new legal rules in the preWarren era had minimal disruptive effect for a variety of reasons. As an
initial matter, key protections of the Bill of Rights did not bind the states
34. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Justice Holmes for this “fundamental rule” of retroactive application); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Judicial decisions have had retrospective
operation for near a thousand years.”).
35. See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62 (1965) (arguing that the courts’ “prestige and power” depend upon
the symbolism of the law declaration model); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective,
with Thoughts for the Future: What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What It
Might, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 1680–81 (2007) (observing that under the declaratory theory of law
that obtained until 1965, the source of new law “is never the Court”).
36. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965); see also Norton v. Shelby Cty., 118 U.S. 425,
442 (1886) (“An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed.”). The old-chestnut American case frequently cited for this proposition was United
States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801), which arose in the context of legislative
retroactivity. It was “general[ly] true,” Chief Justice Marshall observed, that the appellate court’s role
“is only to enquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not.” Id. at 110. However,
“if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied.” Id.
Where “the law be constitutional,” he concluded, “I know of no court which can contest its
obligation.” Id. So far, so clear. However, Chief Justice Marshall hinted in dictum at the tension that
would ultimately give rise to prospective and selectively prospective application in the Warren era,
noting that “in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against
a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties.” Id.; see also
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 542 (1941) (noting extension of Schooner
Peggy principle to adjudicative retroactivity).
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before the 1950s,37 so the impact of many new rules in the criminal context
was restricted to a small pool of potential federal defendants.38 Before the
New Deal expansion of the Commerce Clause,39 moreover, the number of
federal crimes on the books, and hence the number of federal criminal
prosecutions, was comparatively smaller than it is today.40 Given the more
modest compass of federal criminal laws during this period, a default rule
of retroactivity imposed few costs on the system. Finally, in the immediate
post-war period, the Supreme Court, chastened by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan, “was not doing much to arouse
attention, let alone popular ire.”41 The Court took on few ambitious cases,
and its modest work posed little potential for grave disruption.42 In this
climate, it is rather unremarkable that retroactivity was “the dominant
principle,” even when it required “the reversal of judgments which were
correct when entered.”43

37. See generally Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247–48 (1833) (holding that
the limitations reflected in the Bill of Rights did not bind the states). Beginning with Palko v.
Connecticut, the Court selectively incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
those rights deemed fundamental to “the concept of ordered liberty.” 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The
1960s witnessed a particular flurry of activity on the incorporation front. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963)
(extending the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56
(1961) (extending the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment to the states).
38. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982)
(“Measured by the number of prosecutions affected, the selective incorporation rulings had a
monumental impact; in a single decade those rulings expanded the reach of constitutional regulation
of criminal procedure many times beyond that which had been attained through all of the Court’s
constitutional rulings over the previous 170 years.”).
39. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (permitting Congress to reach
wheat grown purely for home consumption under its interstate commerce powers).
40. See J. Richard Broughton, Congressional Inquiry and the Federal Criminal Law, 46 U. RICH.
L. REV. 457, 467–69 (2012) (observing that post-New Deal expansive view of Commerce Clause
gave rise to numerous new federal crimes); Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past
and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 51–52 (1998) (noting that the number of federal criminal laws
surged in the second half of the twentieth century).
41. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 178 (2002).
42. Professor Friedman cites Professor John Frank for the observation that, “If an historian were to
do a one-volume study of American life in the 1940s, he might very well omit any reference to the
Court-Constitution, 1946–50.” Friedman, supra note 41, at 180 (quoting John P. Frank, Court and
Constitution: The Passive Period, 4 VAND. L. REV. 400, 418 (1951)). Professor Frank noted that this
modest output was not due to the absence of hot-button issues in petitions for certiorari: “The docket
turned up opportunities which, had the Court chosen, might have resulted in striking developments,
and this without absurd stretchings of doctrine.” Frank, supra, at 418.
43. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941).
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Balancing in the Warren Era

The era of balancing and prospectivity arrived with the Warren Court
and went hand in hand with its increasingly activist work. Pure and
selective prospectivity developed in both the criminal and civil contexts,
and it is useful here to take these separately.
1.

The Criminal Context

Particularly in the criminal context, the Warren Court dramatically
reshaped the federal judicial power in a way that measurably expanded
the potential systemic impact of its decisions.44 The Court read the Bill of
Rights expansively and, in a series of cases, incorporated these protections
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause so that they equally
bound the states. A trio of cases, Mapp v. Ohio,45 Massiah v. United
States,46 and Miranda v. Arizona, extended the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule to the states,47 imposed significant limitations on
investigative law enforcement contact with suspects after the initiation of
adversary proceedings,48 and massively reshaped the rules regarding
custodial interrogation.49 The criminal procedure decisions, in particular,
risked a public backlash and ultimately “so turn[ed] the public against [the
Court] that a presidential election would turn partly on this issue, and
bring the era of the Warren Court to a close.”50
To a significant degree, these signature pieces of the Warren Court’s
criminal procedure revolution set in place a system of prophylactic
overprotection.51 The innovation of Miranda was not that it barred
44. See generally Corinna B. Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Justice Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1364–65 (2004)
(characterizing the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases as “doctrinally revolutionary,” albeit less
countermajoritarian than popularly assumed); Sarah Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
15, 22–23 (2016) (assessing the impact of the Warren Court’s innovations that “transformed criminal
practice nationwide”); Israel, supra note 38, at 292–98 (describing the selective incorporation
revolution that had, by the end of the 1960s, “changed the ‘face of the law’”) (citation omitted).
45. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
47. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654–56.
48. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206–07.
49. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45.
50. Friedman, supra note 41, at 210.
51. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) (observing that Miranda laid down a
prophylactic rule); Neal Devins, Ideological Cohesion and Precedent (Or Why the Court Only Cares
About Precedent when Most Justices Agree with Each Other), 86 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1426–27 (2008)
(noting the post-1962 Warren Court’s embrace of “prophylactic rules – rules intended to bind lower
courts and government officials (even if it meant sometimes prohibiting otherwise constitutional
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coerced confessions; settled case law already forbade them.52 What
Miranda added, instead, was a set of “proper safeguards” designed to
minimize the likelihood of coerced confessions.53 The Court made clear
that the Constitution does not compel any particular formulation and
assured that Congress and the states were free to come up with other
alternatives.54 Similarly, Mapp laid out the consequence for constitutional
violations—exclusion of wrongfully-seized evidence—in an express
effort to deter law enforcement officers’ misconduct.55 These key
decisions were less about guilt, innocence, or the factfinding process than
the creation of a solid, fair system. The Warren Court sought to align
incentives and procedures in an effort to minimize constitutional
violations going forward.56
The Court thus put in place a series of wide-sweeping new rules that
offered safeguards and protections irrespective of the merits of any
individual defendant’s case.57 It is against this backdrop, and in an
behavior)”); Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of
Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 934 (1999) (noting that Miranda “took as a given that the
Court legitimately could fashion a rule that might foreclose some constitutionally permissible
interrogations in order to ensure against those that were unconstitutional”); David A. Strauss, The
Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988) (contending that Miranda “reads
more like a legislative committee report with an accompanying statute”).
52. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1940) (holding that the state’s five-day
interrogation of defendants amid threats of mob violence compelled defendants’ confessions in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
285–86 (1936) (concluding that the confessions obtained after state officers whipped defendants with
leather straps violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. These “proper safeguards” evolved into the now-familiar Miranda
warnings. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609–09 (2004). Professor Monaghan contended that
Miranda and Mapp set out constitutional common law, operative as gap-filling mechanisms in the
absence of any contrary legislative interpretation. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 (1975). The Court subsequently placed Miranda on somewhat
firmer constitutional footing. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442–43 (2000) (holding
that the Constitution requires either Miranda warnings or “an adequate substitute”).
54. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
55. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
56. Professor Carol S. Steiker distinguished between rules governing officers’ primary conduct
(“conduct rules”) and rules governing the consequences of violating these instructions (“decision
rules”). See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2504 (1996). She observed that in the Rehnquist
era, the Court left the Warren Court’s conduct rules largely intact but developed a series of exceptions
to the Court’s decision rules, riddling these prophylactic schemes with exceptions. Id.
57. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985), the Court acknowledged that, “in the individual
case, Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no
identifiable constitutional harm.” See also Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) (noting that
retrospective application of a prophylactic rule would confer “windfall benefits” on defendants who
have not suffered a constitutional injury).
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atmosphere of significant backlash,58 that the Court pondered the systemic
effects of all-in retroactivity and found room to give its decisions
prospective and selectively prospective effect in proper circumstances.59
To do so, the Court had to reject Blackstonian metaphysics and articulate
a different understanding of the judicial function. In Linkletter v. Walker,
the Court carefully traced its own evolution from a Blackstonian view to
an Austinian view that judges can, and in fact do, make law.60 The Court
forthrightly acknowledged that any new rule it made represented a change
from what had preceded it. The “old” rule was a fact, a guide pursuant to
which actors had conducted their affairs, and in measuring the impact of
any new rule, it was worthwhile to gauge the scope of possible
disruption.61
At issue in Linkletter was the retroactive effect of Mapp v. Ohio.62 A
case decided twelve years prior to Mapp, Wolf v. Colorado,63 had said that
while the protections of the Fourth Amendment were implicit in “the
concept of ordered liberty,” and thus applicable to the states,64 the
exclusionary rule was not.65 Wolf reasoned that states had discretion as to
“[h]ow such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against
it should be afforded, [and] the means by which the right should be made
58. The New York Times Editorial Board found it “regrettable” that the Court “chose to read into
the Constitution authorization for what amounts to a detailed code of station-house procedure,” which
it saw as an “overhasty trespass into the legislative area.” Editorial, Freely and Voluntarily, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1966, at 46.
59. The Linkletter regime initially represented a compromise between liberal justices eager to blunt
criticism of their activist decisions and more conservative justices eager to mitigate damages. See
Beske, supra note 17, at 830; Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1739 (1991) (“It was much easier for the
Court to lay down the Miranda rules, for example, knowing that the prison doors need not necessarily
swing open for every inmate convicted with the aid of confessions not preceded by the requisite
warnings.”).
60. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 625–28 (1965). Legal philosopher John Austin put forth
a theory of positivism that rejected the natural law so dear to Blackstone, tethering law instead to the
existence of human lawmakers. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
136–37 (London, John Murray 1832), https://archive.org/details/provincejurispr02austgoog/
[https://perma.cc/N59U-9LY3] (“Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set
by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, . . . . [or] is set by a monarch, or sovereign
number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.”).
61. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
62. While Linkletter arose in a habeas corpus proceeding, the Court made no attempt to limit its
holding by means of “habeas is different” argument.
63. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
64. Id. at 27–28.
65. Id. at 33. Professor Frank, writing contemporaneously of Wolf, noted that allowing the
admissibility of wrongfully-seized evidence in state court made it “unlikely that any policeman will
change his practices.” Frank, supra note 42, at 415.
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effective.”66 Mapp retracted this remedial flexibility, overruling Wolf and
holding that “the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.”67 In requiring the exclusionary rule, the
Mapp Court noted that “more than half” of states passing upon the issue
since Wolf had adopted some form of it.68 With slightly fewer than half
the states having not adopted the exclusionary rule in the wake of Wolf,
the retroactive application of Mapp to cases that were final or pending on
direct raised the specter of significant disruption. Any trial in which the
prosecutor had introduced evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment—as had been entirely permissible in a post-Wolf, pre-Mapp
universe—was now subject to possible reversal.
Facing this prospect, the Linkletter Court parsed the import of Mapp
and decided to accord it prospective effect as of the date of the Mapp
Court’s decision.69 After satisfying itself that cases did not preclude
according prospective effect to the Court’s decisions where “the interest
of justice” might require it,70 the Court evaluated “the merits and
demerits” of retroactive application of the exclusionary rule.71 This
required examination of “the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation [would] further
or retard its operation.”72 The Court noted that the exclusionary rule’s
primary purpose was to serve as “a deterrent safeguard.”73 Because the
rule sought to influence the choices of law enforcement, rather than to
vindicate a defendant’s rights, it made little sense to apply it retroactively.
A deterrent only worked to influence behavior before the behavior
occurred; a deterrent applied after the fact made no sense.74 Finally, the
Court noted and found very significant that the application—or not—of
the exclusionary rule did not go to “the very integrity of the fact-finding

66. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27–28.
67. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
68. Id. at 651.
69. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639–40 (1965).
70. Id. at 628.
71. Id. at 629.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 634–35; see also id. at 636 (noting that Mapp had found the exclusionary rule to be “the
only effective deterrent to lawless police action”).
74. See id. at 637 (“We cannot say that this purpose would be advanced by making the rule
retrospective.”).
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process,”75 a point that allowed it to distinguish cases involving coerced
confessions.76
The Linkletter Court thus set up a dichotomy between prophylactic
rules designed to deter misconduct and rules that enhance the reliability
of the guilt-innocence determination. The Court deliberately housed the
exclusionary rule in the deterrence cubbyhole.77 From there, it was easy
to disclaim a result that would confer major systemic catastrophe on the
many states whose officers and prosecutors had relied on twelve-year-old
Wolf, “an operative fact . . . [with] consequences which cannot justly be
ignored.”78 Where the retroactive application of a rule would serve no
arguable purpose, vindicate no right actually possessed by the defendant,
and not enhance the reliability of the conviction, it simply was not worth
the formidable cost. In freeing itself to circumscribe the retroactive effect
of new rules, the Court was able to sidestep additional controversy that its
broad decisions generated by blunting their systemic impact.79
Subsequent cases elaborated upon this balancing test, reinforcing the
Court’s dichotomy between procedures designed to enhance confidence
in the guilt-innocence determination and procedures designed primarily
to keep police officers in line and to bolster confidence in the system. A
comparison of two cases involving the Sixth Amendment demonstrates
the point. In Stovall v. Denno,80 the Court considered the retroactivity of
a rule that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
for pre-indictment lineups.81 The Court declined to accord the rule
retroactive effect after finding, as it had in Linkletter, that the rule’s
primary purpose was to deter police misconduct.82 The Court reasoned
75. Id. at 639.
76. See id. at 638 (distinguishing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1961), both of which dealt with coerced confessions that called into question the basic fairness of the
underlying conviction).
77. Even in Linkletter though, which directly said the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
police misconduct, one finds language to the effect that the exclusionary rule is “an essential part of
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the only effective remedy for the protection of
rights under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 634 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 636 (citing Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940)).
79. See Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 21, at 974 (observing that “the lure
of making new decisions less than fully retroactive proved impossible to resist, both for Justices
anxious to contain the harms of what they saw as badly flawed decisions and those wanting to ensure
that ‘long[] overdue reforms’ would not be inhibited” (footnote omitted) (quoting Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969)).
80. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
81. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 271–72 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
236–38 (1967).
82. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297.
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that the presence or absence of counsel at the pre-indictment lineup stage
had little to no impact on the reliability of the guilt-innocence
determination.83 Although the rule was a prophylactic aimed at
“minimizing [the] possibility” of unfairness, the actual risk of unfairness
due to misconduct at this stage was not so great as to require retroactive
effect.84 The Court contrasted this rule with that at issue in Gideon v.
Wainwright,85 which recognized a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at
trial.86 The Stovall Court held that a rule like that recognized in Gideon
should have full retroactive effect because the whole purpose of trial was
the ascertainment of truth.87 The requirement of an attorney at trial was
fundamental to the reliability of the guilt-innocence determination,
whereas the requirement of an attorney at other, less crucial stages, was
not.88
Looking at these cases as a whole, the Linkletter regime reflects the
straightforward recognition that, where many convictions have been
obtained under preexisting rules, it makes sense to insist that new rules
have retroactive (and thus significantly disruptive) effect only where
operation of the old rules gives reason to question the accuracy of the
underlying guilty verdict. Moreover, in cases where the rule exists
primarily to deter the police officer or prosecutor in the abstract and is
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
86. See id. at 342–45.
87. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297–98.
88. The distinction between rights that secure confidence in the underlying verdict and rights that
overprotect as a prophylactic to keep police officers within bounds of good behavior was a persistent
theme during this period. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Court rejected
retroactive effect for Miranda and a related case, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Court
observed that, while these rules “guard against the possibility of unreliable statements in every
instance of in-custody interrogation, they encompass situations in which the danger is not necessarily
as great as when the accused is subject to overt and obvious coercion.” Johnson, 384 U.S. at 730. The
risk of getting the guilt-innocence determination wrong by permitting admission of un-Mirandized
statements, in other words, was not significant, and preexisting rules barring admission of actual
coerced confessions served as an adequate backstop. In a similar vein, Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244 (1969), held that the rule of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), permitting Fourth
Amendment protection and applying the exclusionary rule against non-physical searches, would not
have retroactive effect. Desist, 394 U.S. at 249–50. The Desist Court again noted that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule was to deter police, calling it “but a procedural weapon that has no bearing on
guilt.” Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted). These cases contrast with cases like Roberts v. Russell,
392 U.S. 293 (1968), which required retroactive application of the rule of Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968), barring admission of a co-defendant’s confession that implicated the defendant.
See Roberts, 392 U.S. at 294–95. The Roberts Court characterized Bruton error as a “serious flaw[]”
that might materially influence the jury and thus undermine confidence in the guilt-innocence
determination at trial. Id.
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unrelated to the guilt-innocence determination, the “right” possessed by
the previously-convicted defendant is not robust,89 and refusing
retroactive effect to others in the pipeline arguably creates little injustice.90
2.

The Civil Context

The Court definitively established its ability to make new rules
prospective or selectively prospective in the civil context as of 1971.91 In
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, the Court considered the retroactive effect of
its decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,92 which held that
state statutes of limitation, rather than the more lenient admiralty laches
doctrine, governed disputes under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act.93 Relying on laches, the plaintiff had brought his personal injury
action after the one-year state statute of limitations lapsed.94 After the
lapse, the Court announced Rodrigue. In deciding whether the state statute
should preclude the plaintiff’s action, the Huson Court examined the
extent to which the new rule represented a major break with prior
precedent, the new rule’s purpose and effect, and the unfairness of
retroactive application to the litigants.95 Applying this construct to the
facts, the Court found that the plaintiff’s reliance on the old rule was
justifiable, as “the most he could do was rely on the law as it then was.”96
The Court observed, moreover, that Congress’s incorporation of state
statutes of limitation was designed to facilitate suits by injured employees
by giving them “comprehensive and familiar remedies.”97 Because the
plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable and barring the plaintiff’s suit

89. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (stating that prime “if not the sole”
purpose of rule is deterrence); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing
exclusionary rule as a deterrent, “rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved”).
90. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) (noting that retroactive application of
prophylactic rules could confer “windfall” benefits on defendants who had not faced constitutional
deprivations); Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301 (acknowledging that “chance beneficiaries” were inevitable
due to limitation on advisory opinions).
91. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), the Court refused to grant broad retroactive
effect to its holding that municipal restrictions on who could vote in elections approving revenue
bonds were unconstitutional. See id. at 706. The Court cited Linkletter for this proposition and did not
engage in significant analysis, noting only that “[s]ignificant hardships” would inure to retroactive
invalidation of securities sold or issued prior to the decision. Id.
92. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
93. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 98–99, 105 (1971).
94. Id. at 99.
95. Id. at 106–07.
96. Id. at 107.
97. Id. at 107–08.
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thwarted, rather than advanced, the underlying purpose of the statute, the
Court refused to give the new rule retroactive effect.98
In the civil context, as in the criminal context, the Court continued to
balance the costs of retroactivity against its purported benefit. The Court
applied principles of prospectivity in Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.99 to lessen the impact of a decision invalidating
bankruptcy court adjudication of private contract claims.100 The Court
noted prior cases had not foreshadowed its opinion and concluded that
retroactive application of the rule would impose great cost and little
benefit.101 Implicit in the conclusion, of course, was the idea that the injury
to any individual litigant from having a non-Article III entity decide a
private contract claim was not significant and rarely bore on the merits of
the tribunal’s decisionmaking. As such, limiting the decision’s retroactive
effect would not work profound injustice.102
In this era, too, the Court struggled with Title VII103 cases, particularly
those cases in which backpay remedies would impose significant
unanticipated liabilities on state treasuries. Ultimately, the Court decided
to accord them prospective rather than retrospective effect. In City of Los
Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,104 the Court held that
a state rule requiring female employees to pay more into the state pension
fund than male employees violated Title VII.105 Turning to the question
of remedy, the Court noted the equitable nature of Title VII remedies and
observed that state administrators had acted in good-faith in addressing a
complex problem.106 The Court saw the overarching goal of Title VII in
deterrence terms, concluding that “[t]here is no reason to believe that the
threat of a backpay award” would be necessary to bring administrators
into prospective compliance.107 Five years later, the Court reached the
same conclusion in Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred

98. Id. at 109.
99. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
100. Id. at 87–88.
101. See id. at 87–89.
102. The Court had done much the same thing in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), albeit without
significant discussion. See id. at 142–43 (according de facto validity to past acts of the Federal
Election Commission despite holding that the method by which Commissioners had been appointed
violated the Appointments Clause). See infra notes 351–56 and accompanying text.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018).
104. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
105. Id. at 711.
106. Id. at 719–20.
107. Id. at 720–21.
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Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris.108 After joining four
Justices to find the underlying violation, Justice O’Connor joined the
other four Justices in refusing to accord the decision retroactive effect.109
In a concurrence justifying her vote Justice O’Connor observed
Manhart’s holding “that a central purpose of Title VII is to prevent
employers from treating individual workers on the basis of sexual or racial
group characteristics,” a purpose that did not require the Court to impose
backpay and that was outweighed by the risk that compelling refunds
would bankrupt state funds and impose catastrophic, unforeseeable
damage on innocent third-parties.110
Two 1987 opinions highlight the overarching importance of the
reasonableness of plaintiff’s reliance on the “old” rule in the Court’s
retroactivity inquiry. In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,111 the plaintiff class
relied on Pennsylvania’s six-year statute of limitations for contract actions
in pursuing a 1973 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.112 Four years after the
plaintiffs filed suit, a court of appeals decision held that the six-year
statute of limitations, rather than Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims, applied. In Goodman, the court of
appeals overruled this prior decision and concluded instead that the state’s
two-year limitations period for personal injury actions governed, a
conclusion with which the Supreme Court agreed.113 Turning to the
retroactivity question, the Court found that the 1973 plaintiffs’ reliance on
a six-year period was unreasonable; at the time the plaintiffs filed suit,
there was no clear precedent on which they could have relied, and as such,
they should have known that the applicable limitations period was an
unsettled question.114 In Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,115 in
contrast, different Pennsylvania plaintiffs filed a civil rights claim after
the 1977 court of appeals decision had specifically selected the six-year
statute of limitations.116 Under the circumstances, the Court found

108. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam) (concluding that Title VII prohibits the state retirement
plan from including options that pay out smaller benefits to female employees).
109. Id. at 1075.
110. Id. at 1110–12 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
111. 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
112. Id. at 658–59. Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States” have the same right to “make and enforce contracts” as “white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(2018).
113. See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 662.
114. Id. at 662–64.
115. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
116. Id. at 606–07.
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plaintiffs’ reliance reasonable; there was a case on point that eliminated
all doubt as to the applicable period on which the plaintiffs based their
litigation decisions.117 As to these plaintiffs, but not the Goodman
plaintiffs, the Court disclaimed retroactive application of the new twoyear period.
3.

Putting it All Together: Balancing in the Linkletter/Huson Era

“[R]econciling the constitutional interests reflected in a new rule of law
with reliance interests founded upon the old is ‘among the most difficult
[processes] which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
federal.’”118 Looking carefully at the Court’s approach to this vexing
problem in both the criminal and civil contexts during the
Linkletter/Huson era, it is possible to discern a method to the Court’s
madness.119 In the criminal context, the Court took a hard look at the
purposes of any new rule that it announced. The Court perceived some
rules to be significant and rooted in both fundamental fairness and the
very essence of the guilt-innocence determination.120 These rules served
purposes that were vital to the defendant; any ancillary benefits achieved
by the new rule were just that—a bonus rather than an overt objective.
Other rules, in contrast, were either less weighty in that they served as
prophylactics or less important to the criminal defendant in that they
primarily, or even exclusively, served other, unrelated purposes, like
deterrence. The Court set up these perceived individual interests, weighty
or comparatively insubstantial, on one side of the scale. On the other, it
placed the inevitable disruption that would arise by according new rules
retroactive effect. Only where individual fairness interests outweighed
disruption did the Court allow its new rules to apply to other cases in the
pipeline; in other circumstances, it did not.121
117. Id. at 608–09.
118. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 198 (1973) (citing Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940)).
119. This “method” resembles in significant respects Professors Fallon and Meltzer’s proffered
post-Griffith remedial framework. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 59, at 1807–11. The same
insights and instincts arguably obtained in the Linkletter balancing era.
120. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1977) (noting that the Court had
“never deviated” from the rule that retroactivity is required where a new rule corrects an error that
substantially threatens the truth-determining function of the trial); cf. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719, 728–29 (1966) (noting that the Miranda violation did not cast doubt upon reliability of
verdict); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637–38 (1965) (calling the exclusionary rule a
“procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt”).
121. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) (“It is an inherent attribute of prophylactic
constitutional rules, such as those established in Miranda and Pearce, that their retrospective
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On the civil side, the Court likewise examined the importance and
purpose of the new rule and weighed it against the perceived disruption
of requiring retroactive effect. In Huson, imposing a shorter statute of
limitations conferred a windfall benefit on a defendant who had inflicted
injury when a longer one applied. At the same time, it undermined the
plaintiff-protective regime Congress had sought to create.122 Against this
insubstantial benefit to retroactive application, the preclusion of a
plaintiff’s lawsuit altogether by a clear, post hoc change in the rules gave
rise to substantial injustice. The Court’s decision to apply its separation
of powers holding in Northern Pipeline prospectively, too, reflects the
intuition that individual claimants did not suffer actual unfairness or injury
from adjudication of their claim by a non-Article III tribunal.123 The
system encourages litigants to raise these claims, but any individual
litigant’s interest in application of the new rule to his or her case is not
robust; retroactivity in this context gives rise to needless disruption while
conferring either nonexistent or windfall benefits. Finally, the Court’s
Title VII cases laid bare its conflict between recognizing rules and
blunting their impact. In Norris, Justice O’Connor made a point of
justifying Title VII in deterrence terms.124 Once she had distanced
Title VII from a victim-compensating purpose, she was able to weigh a
comparatively weaker value—marginal additional deterrent—against the
possibility of bankrupted state pension funds.125
During the Linkletter/Huson regime, the Court’s core motivating
principle was fairness, and it acted to spare litigants the effects of new
rules where applying them would work injustice126 and to require that
litigants obtain the benefits of new rules where refusing to apply them
would work injustice.127 This impulse reflected and gave effect to the
application will occasion windfall benefits for some defendants who have suffered no constitutional
deprivation.”); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637 (noting that making Mapp retroactive would “tax the
administration of justice to the utmost”).
122. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107–08 (1971).
123. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87–88 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
124. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463
U.S. 1073, 1110–11 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., id. (flagging inequity of requiring state pension funds to issue refunds); Huson, 404
U.S. at 108–09 (noting injustice of barring suit filed in reliance on prior understanding of statute of
limitations period).
127. See, e.g., Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294–95 (1968) (requiring application of new rule
barring admission of co-defendant’s confession that implicated defendant); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 297–98 (1967) (suggesting that the Gideon rule recognizing Sixth Amendment right to
counsel should have full retroactive effect).
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basic insight that, in general, a system works best when people can rely
on rules that govern their primary conduct.128 The light turns green, and
people may enter the intersection. Thereafter, the rules may change so that
purple, not green, means go, and society can and does adjust. But the
Court’s Linkletter/Huson rulings reflect appreciation for the basic
unfairness of imposing sanction for having ventured into the intersection
under then-prevailing green rules unless doing so is of utmost importance.
Perceived unfairness can erode the respect for the rule of law generally,
which can be very destabilizing and can undermine the Court’s
institutional legitimacy.129 In permitting upset to reliance interests only
where vital concerns of fairness were at stake, the Court struck a careful
balance after precisely defining the interests advanced by new rules.
Where a new rule served primarily as a deterrent or prophylactic, the
injustice to defendants in refusing application was small, and the
overarching value of allowing the public to rely on old rules easily
outweighed it.
4.

Dissent During the Linkletter/Huson Era

Although the Linkletter/Huson era commenced with broad agreement
among the justices that pure and selective prospectivity were permissible,
over time that consensus fractured. In Desist v. United States130 and
Mackey v. United States,131 Justice Harlan urged that “[r]etroactivity must
be rethought.”132 For Justice Harlan, the problems with prospectivity were
twofold. First, he noted that the Court had made various pronouncements
about when, exactly, an opinion was to have effect, applying some rules
to cases in which trials had not commenced, others to cases in which

128. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing that
unpredictable variance in rules governing primary conduct would give rise to “debilitating uncertainty
in the planning of everyday affairs”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1904 (2004) (acknowledging fundamental importance of predictability
in rules governing primary conduct). In the context of personal jurisdiction, the Court has underscored
the importance of “allow[ing] potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” Burger
King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
129. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 489 (1954) (“People repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov’s dogs, to two or more inconsistent sets
of directions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could not fail in the end to react as the
dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer a nervous breakdown.”).
130. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
131. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
132. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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questionable evidence had not yet been introduced, and others to cases in
which the underlying conduct of law enforcement, now proscribed, had
not yet occurred.133 Second, Justice Harlan faulted the Linkletter/Huson
regime for according different treatment to similarly situated criminal
defendants, all of whom may have raised identical claims on appeal, thus
giving rise to unequal treatment and “chance beneficiaries.”134
With respect to the first criticism, although Justice Harlan’s dissent
made the Court look positively unprincipled, he created a bit of a straw
man. The Court’s triggers for when an opinion was to have effect
generally dovetailed with the moment at which the offense to the
Constitution took place. Thus, if the rule mandated that the state do or
refrain from doing something before trial, the Court held that its decision
applied to cases in which the state’s action or inaction took place after
announcement of the new rule.135 If the rule barred admission of tainted
evidence or testimony at trial, the Court generally held its opinion applied
to any case in which the tainted evidence had not yet been introduced or
the trial had not yet commenced.136 The common thread unifying the
Court’s selective prospectivity opinions was that law enforcement officers
and prosecutors generally could know, under the Court’s prospectivity
rules, that they would not be punished or otherwise disadvantaged for
heeding an existing rule.
Justice Harlan’s concern about different treatment among similarly
situated litigants, too, is not beyond reproach. This criticism overlooked
the Court’s distinction between rights that inured to the benefit of criminal
defendants and those that existed primarily to serve another purpose, like
deterring law enforcement misconduct and fostering systemic regularity.
If the exclusionary rule did not protect the defendant so much as it deterred
law enforcement misconduct, then benefitting one defendant while
withholding that benefit from others did not work major injustice. The
Stovall majority grappled with and rejected Justice Harlan’s criticism
head-on, suggesting that it was constrained to give the benefit to the rule
to Stovall, even though it was designed purely as a deterrent, because of
Article III’s injunction against advisory opinions and the need to maintain
133. Id. at 257 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 258–59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The “chance beneficiaries” terminology is used in
the majority and dissenting opinions in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301, 304 (1968).
135. See, e.g., Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300–01 (holding that the rule governing pretrial identification
should not have retroactive effect); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 (1968) (holding that the
rule governing unanimous juries in criminal contempt trials should not have retroactive effect).
136. See, e.g., Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968) (restricting the rule barring admission of
evidence obtained in violation of federal communications statute to “trials in which the evidence is
sought to be introduced after the date of our decision”).
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“the incentive of counsel to advance contentions requiring a change in the
law.”137 The Stovall Court saw the creation of “chance beneficiaries” as
an unavoidable part of the process that required it to ground legal change
in an adversarial context.138
C.

The Backlash: The Rehnquist Court and Adjudicative Retroactivity

The Warren Court could not keep backlash at bay indefinitely, and
during the 1968 election, Richard Nixon “ran against the liberal Warren
Court almost as much as his actual opponent.”139 Nixon “made no secret
of his agenda for the Court: he wanted to appoint justices who would take
a different approach, particularly to criminal defendants’ rights.”140 In his
first term, President Nixon appointed four Supreme Court justices, thus
palpably shifting the Court rightward.141 The Burger Court, while not
outright overruling key Warren Court precedents like Miranda and Mapp,
set to work limiting their application and circumscribing defendants’
ability to take advantage of them.142 Continuing this course, the Rehnquist
Court revisited the issue of retroactivity, starting first in the criminal
context before tackling the civil.143 As Professors Richard H. Fallon and
Daniel J. Meltzer have noted, in this post-Warren Court era, full
retroactivity, and “Justice Harlan’s portrait of a judicial process that is
reasoned, restrained, traditional, and distinctly non-legislative,”
conformed neatly with the conservative ideal.144

137. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301. The Stovall majority cited Professor Paul Mishkin’s Harvard
Foreword, in which he recognized that our system requires adversarial presentation of issues, which
depends, “not unnaturally, upon the incentive supplied by the possibility of winning a rewarding
judgment.” Mishkin, supra note 35, at 60.
138. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301.
139. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 4 (2004).
140. David A. Strauss, Why the Burger Court Mattered, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2018)
(reviewing MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE
JUDICIAL RIGHT (2016)).
141. President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist.
142. See GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 140, at 42–54 (describing the Court’s use of
procedural obstacles to limit the assertion of rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments).
143. For a more in-depth treatment of adjudicative retroactivity during the Rehnquist Court, see
Beske, supra note 17, at 832–43.
144. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 59, at 1745.
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The Criminal Context

Although Justice Harlan’s criticisms of the Linkletter/Huson regime
were not unassailable, they gained traction in the decades that followed
before finally finding acceptance in the Rehnquist Court. In Griffith v.
Kentucky,145 the Court formally rejected selective prospectivity.146 Griffith
considered the retroactive effect of the rule of Batson v. Kentucky,147
which invalidated the race-based use of peremptory challenges under the
Equal Protection Clause. Relying heavily on criticisms of prospectivity
advanced decades previously by Justice Harlan, the Griffith Court rejected
balancing, holding that new rules would have effect in all cases pending
on direct appeal.148 The Court reasoned that, if it did not resolve cases “in
light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles” but
instead laid down rules that would have largely prospective effect, it
would be usurping the role of the legislature.149 The Court additionally
noted that “treating similarly situated defendants” differently by affording
benefit only to the litigants in the case in which the new rule is announced
violated principles of fairness.150
Two years later, the Court issued Teague v. Lane,151 which made clear
that the Griffith retroactivity rule would not apply in the habeas context.
In Teague, the plurality152 indicated that it would neither make nor apply
new rules on habeas save in situations where a rule placed “certain kinds
of primary . . . conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe” or set forth a “watershed rule[] of criminal
procedure” without which application confidence in the verdict would be
misplaced.153 Over time, the Court characterized this first exception as an
exception for “new substantive rules,” which generally bore on the guiltinnocence determination and would apply retroactively, and the second

145. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
146. Id. at 322–23.
147. 479 U.S. 79 (1986).
148. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.
149. Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
150. Id.
151. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
152. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, for four justices, was adopted by the Court shortly
thereafter in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313–14 (1989).
153. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. The Teague exceptions bear considerable resemblance to the
situations in which the Warren Court found itself compelled to find rules retroactive. See supra notes
85–88 and accompanying text.

06 - Beske.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

5/30/2019 10:22 AM

BACKDOOR BALANCING

669

exception as a carve-out for procedural rules, which almost invariably
would not.154
Together, Griffith and Teague set up a clear enough regime: All new
rules have immediate, retroactive effect in cases pending on direct review,
but only a small subset of new rules—those vital rules without which we
would lack confidence in the guilt-innocence determination—would have
retroactive effect to cases arising on habeas. The Court cited both Griffith
and Teague approvingly in 2016 in Montgomery v. Louisiana.155 The
framework they set out remains officially in place today.
2.

The Civil Context

Griffith specifically left Huson intact in the civil context,156 and
flexibility and balancing remained the governing approach in this sphere
until a series of cases invalidating discriminatory state taxes under the
dormant commerce clause prompted reexamination. In Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias,157 the Court struck down a Hawaii excise tax that exempted
in-state liquor producers.158 In McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco,159 the Court held that a state that had collected
taxes in violation of Bacchus Imports without providing a pre-deprivation
remedy had to provide a meaningful post-deprivation remedy that cured
the underlying violation—either a refund of taxes collected by out-of-state
producers or a collection of back taxes from in-state producers.160 Taken
together, these cases spelled potential financial ruin for states that had
employed these kinds of discriminatory schemes, and state litigants
immediately sought to use Huson to blunt their retroactive effect.
The Court’s decisions proceeded haltingly. In American Trucking
Ass’ns v. Smith,161 five justices rejected retroactive effect of a rule
invalidating a complicated scheme preferring in-state truckers, but took
154. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004). As of this writing, the Court has not
recognized a “watershed rule” of procedure meriting retroactive effect post-Teague. It bears mention
that the dichotomy between substantive rules affecting confidence in the guilt-innocence
determination and procedural rules mirrors the distinction drawn in the Linkletter regime: under
Linkletter, procedural rules typically had prospective effect and substantive rules typically had
retroactive effect. Teague’s first exception preserves this framework explicitly in the habeas context.
155. 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 727–28 (2016). Justice Scalia, in dissent, stated that “the Griffith
rule is constitutionally compelled.” Id. at 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 n.8 (1987).
157. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
158. Id. at 270–73.
159. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
160. Id. at 22–23.
161. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).

06 - Beske.docx (Do Not Delete)

670

5/30/2019 10:22 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:645

very different paths to get there.162 Justice O’Connor, writing for herself
and three other justices, followed Huson and found the disruption of
requiring a tax refund militated in favor of prospective effect.163 She noted
that the state had justifiably relied on the old rule, and “the inequity of
unsettling actions taken in reliance on those precedents is apparent,”
particularly where a refund “could deplete the state treasury.”164 Justice
Scalia, writing for himself, disclaimed retroactive application of the rule
because he rejected the new rule and believed the Court should overrule
it.165 He pointedly noted, though, that Article III generally required
retroactive application of new rules, thus bringing his reasoning into direct
conflict with the rationale employed by Justice O’Connor and the other
three justices.166
The next year, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,167 six
justices voted to permit retroactive application of Bacchus Imports, but
the majority broke into three camps, each of which had a different take on
the doctrine. Justice Souter deemed selective prospectivity incompatible
with Griffith, which he said “cannot be confined to the criminal law.”168
Justice Souter called pure prospectivity into question offhandedly, noting
that even “[a]ssuming that pure prospectivity may be had at all, moreover,
its scope must necessarily be limited to a small number of cases.”169
Justice White, too, rejected selective prospectivity because it treated
similarly situated litigants differently.170 However, Justice White, in
contrast to Justice Souter, sought to preserve Huson by permitting pure
prospectivity.171 Finally, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Scalia, was
willing to go furthest of all, seeking to shelve Huson altogether and adopt
a rule of full retroactivity in all non-final cases.172 Justice Scalia, writing
for himself, tied this rule specifically to Article III, arguing that permitting

162. Smith involved the retroactive effect of American Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266
(1987). The Scheiner Court held that preference-based taxes on highway use discriminated against
interstate commerce but remanded the question of remedy to the state court. Id. at 297–98.
163. Smith, 496 U.S. at 182–83, 187.
164. Id. at 182.
165. Id. at 201–02 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
166. Id.
167. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
168. Id. at 540 (Souter, J.).
169. Id. at 541.
170. Id. at 545 (White, J. concurring in the judgment).
171. Id. at 545–46.
172. Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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selective or pure prospectivity would nullify a crucial constitutional
limitation on the business of Article III courts.173
Rejection of prospectivity and balancing finally found five votes and a
single rationale in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation in 1993.
Harper concerned a challenge to a state tax scheme that taxed federal
retiree benefits but exempted state retiree benefits.174 A 1989 case, Davis
v. Michigan Department of the Treasury,175 had invalidated such a scheme
on the basis of intergovernmental tax immunity.176 Hoping to obviate the
blow of paying out refunds to all federal retirees, the state argued that,
under Huson, the Davis rule should have prospective effect.177 The Court,
per Justice Thomas, held that James B. Beam controlled and that, when
the Court applies a new rule to the parties before it, the rule “must be given
full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all
events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our
announcement of the rule.”178
After Harper, then, adjudicative retroactivity has full force in both the
criminal and civil contexts: officially, at least, any litigant whose case is
still pending when a new rule issues may lay claim to that rule and ask a
court to apply it in his or her case. The Court has frequently suggested that
the Constitution requires adjudicative retroactivity, although it has always
been a little murky about the basis for this suggestion. First, drawing upon
Justice Harlan’s dissents in the Warren Era, the Court has manifested
routine discomfort with the arbitrariness of giving one litigant the benefit
of a rule while denying its effect in similar cases, a concern with equal
treatment that at least sounds like it has constitutional underpinnings.179
Second, and perhaps more compellingly, the Court has suggested that
Article III’s case or controversy requirement limits judges to
173. Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
174. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 90–91 (1993).
175. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
176. Id. at 817.
177. See Brief for Respondent at 11–25, Harper, 509 U.S. 86 (No. 91-794), 1992 WL 541272, at
*11–29.
178. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
179. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (stating that selectively applying new
rules “violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same”). Although it has
frequently sounded the fairness and equal treatment refrain in this context, the Court is unlikely to tie
adjudicative retroactivity specifically to due process or equal protection because doing so will require
it to impose similar adjudicative retroactivity requirements on state courts. See Beske, supra note 17,
at 845–46. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932),
the Supreme Court stated emphatically that “the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject”
of state retroactivity: “A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for
itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward.” Id.
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decisionmaking as an incidental byproduct of taking each case as it comes
and precludes abstract rulemaking.180 Prospective rulemaking also gives
rise to separation of powers concerns, trenching on the legislative
function. As the Harper Court emphasized, “the nature of judicial review”
strips the federal courts of this “quintessentially legislative
prerogative.”181
3.

Entrenchment of Adjudicative Retroactivity

Once adjudicative retroactivity was in place, the Court firmly rejected
attempts to walk it back. In Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, the Court
evaluated the retroactive effect of Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises, Inc.,182 which had invalidated a statute of limitations tolling
provision that benefited in-state actors over out-of-state actors.183 Hyde,
the respondent, found her suit time-barred after Bendix and asked the
Court to consider principles of equity, fairness, and reasonable reliance in
fashioning a remedy.184 In other words, she sought to invoke remedial
discretion as a mechanism for escaping application of Bendix and
permitting an otherwise time-barred suit to proceed. The Court, per Justice
Breyer, rejected use of “remedy” to avoid retroactive operation of
Bendix.185 States had discretion amongst remedies that might cure
constitutional violations, but they could not invoke “remedial discretion”
to avoid any cure whatsoever.186 To permit such machinations, the Court
found, would deprive Harper of all but “symbolic significance.”187
In the course of the opinion, the Court rejected Hyde’s argument that
the Court had, in the interests of fairness, recognized other situations in
which new rules would not have effect.188 Hyde sought to override rigid
application of Harper by pointing to qualified immunity under Harlow v.

180. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 106 (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling prospective decisionmaking
“incompatible with the judicial power”); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 547
(1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (permitting prospectivity would “warp the role
that we, as judges, play in a Government of limited powers”).
181. Harper, 509 U.S. at 95 (quoting Griffith, 469 U.S. at 322) (internal quotations omitted).
182. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
183. Id. at 891.
184. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752–53.
185. Id. at 755–56. Recall that remedial discretion had surfaced in Arizona Governing Committee
for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1110–12 (1983)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
186. Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S at 752–53, 759–61.
187. Id. at 754.
188. Id. at 757–59.
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Fitzgerald,189 under which officers are immune from liability for
violations of new rules, and Teague v. Lane, which, as noted, had held that
only a small subset of new rules apply in habeas corpus proceedings. The
Court was not persuaded. Justice Breyer reasoned that qualified immunity
permits officers to rely on old law “lest threat of liability ‘dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’”190 These “special
federal policy considerations” had “nothing to do with retroactivity” and
did not justify creating a different, ad hoc exception to Harper.191 With
respect to Teague, the Court said it reflects a limitation on the applicability
of the doctrine of adjudicative retroactivity rather than “an exception.”192
The Court explained that, Teague, too, was based on concerns for finality
and federalism that were unrelated to principles of adjudicative
retroactivity.193
In Davis v. United States,194 the Court again differentiated its
retroactivity scheme—which remained in place—from the “distinct
doctrine[]” permitting law enforcement to rely in good faith on existing
precedents.195 This “distinct doctrine” will be discussed in greater depth
in the next section, but for now it bears mention that the Davis Court
specifically upheld the Court’s retroactivity regime while announcing that
good-faith reliance rules bore no relationship to the retroactivity inquiry,
in that way treating good-faith reliance just as the Court had treated
qualified immunity in Reynoldsville Casket.
Subsequent to Griffith and Harper, and as amplified in Reynoldsville
Casket, there is a firm rule of adjudicative retroactivity that imposes a duty
upon courts fielding pending cases to grapple with the impact of new
rules. As Hyde observed in Reynoldsville Casket, this firm rule is often
honored in the breach, and the next Part analyzes the hodgepodge of
exceptions in search of a unifying set of principles.196

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 757–58 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814).
Id. at 758–59.
Id. at 759.
Id.
564 U.S. 229 (2011).
Id. at 243.
Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 757–59.
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“INDEPENDENT” DOCTRINES THAT BLUNT THE IMPACT
OF NEW RULES

Its commitment to adjudicative retroactivity notwithstanding, the Court
has employed many different doctrines and devices to soften the impact
of new rules and mitigate the unfairness of judicial change, including
qualified immunity, good-faith reliance on existing rules, forfeiture,
harmless error, and remedial discretion in tax refund cases. These rules
can be loosely grouped. Qualified immunity and rules permitting officers’
good-faith reliance on existing Fourth Amendment rules broadly allow
law enforcement officers to operate without concern that a change in the
rules will give rise to personal or professional consequence. Forfeiture and
harmless error doctrines both incorporate the notion that only outcomedeterminative or fundamental errors command backward-looking
attention and justify overturning a criminal conviction.
This Part aims to show that these doctrines incorporate a balance
between the importance of the new rule and the interests it serves against
justifiable reliance on the old rule and the disruption of applying the new
rule retroactively. Each doctrine therefore subsumes the values and
inquiries the Court undertook during the now-repudiated Linkletter/Huson
regime. Almost without exception, the Court today would reach the same
results that it reached under Linkletter and Huson, for most of the same
reasons.197
A.

Qualified Immunity Permitting Officers to Rely on Settled Rules

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,198 individuals may bring damage actions
against state and federal officers, respectively, in their personal capacities

197. This Part addresses doctrines that the Court has used self-consciously to limit the impact of a
new rule. Professors Daniel B. Rice and Jack Boeglin have recently identified the practice of confining
prior cases to their facts as another mechanism by which the Court can preserve reliance interests, at
least in identical or near-identical factual contexts, and thereby limit new rules to prospective effect.
See Daniel B. Rice & Jack Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3240320
[https://perma.cc/CUZ2MQ4M]. As a nice example of this point, they cite Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S.
445 (1957), in which the Court declined to extend to analogous circumstances, but kept intact,
professional baseball’s antitrust exemption because of the “injustices of retroactivity and surprise”
that would attend a contrary result. See Rice & Boeglin, supra note at 22 (quoting Radovich, 352 U.S.
at 452) (noting that Radovich “permitted a salutary change in the law, while ensuring the continued
survival of an industry that had been structured in reliance on it”). Rice and Boeglin aptly deem
confining and prospective rulemaking “jurisprudential cousins.” Id. at 28–29.
198. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

06 - Beske.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

5/30/2019 10:22 AM

BACKDOOR BALANCING

675

for certain constitutional violations.199 These actions are subject to
officers’ assertion of the defense of qualified immunity. 200 The qualified
immunity that state and federal actors presently enjoy against § 1983 and
Bivens actions for damages emerged in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,201 while the
Linkletter/Huson regime was in full swing. Before Harlow, the Court had
protected officers who acted with a subjective, good-faith belief in the
lawfulness of their conduct.202 In an effort to streamline the process and
foster quicker pre-discovery resolution of immunity claims, Harlow
rejected the subjectivity inquiry.203 The Court instead tethered qualified
immunity to an objective assessment of whether the officer had violated
clearly established law,204 holding that “government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”205
Armed with qualified immunity, then, state and federal officers
generally face no exposure to damage actions unless their actions violate
already-established law. It follows, obviously, that prospective plaintiffs
will not get the benefit of any “new” rule announced after an officer
engages in the complained-of conduct. If the rule is new, then by
199. Id. Bivens recognized an implied right of action against federal officers for Fourth Amendment
violations. Id. at 397. The Court has sharply limited Bivens actions to a narrow set of circumstances.
See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (noting that “expanding the Bivens
remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
200. For a detailed look at the doctrine of qualified immunity, see generally Chaim Saiman,
Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1159–68 (2005) (tracing the evolution of the
doctrine), and Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity After Ziglar v. Abbasi: The Case for a
Categorical Approach, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 387–402 (2018) (examining qualified immunity after
the Court’s most recent lengthy application).
201. Harlow itself dealt with qualified immunity in the Bivens context but specifically extended its
holding to § 1983 actions against state actors: “This case involves no issue concerning the elements
of the immunity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We have found previously, however, that it would be ‘untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of
immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly
under the Constitution against federal officials.’” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30 (1982)
(quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
202. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (recognizing “the defense of good faith and
probable cause”).
203. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
204. Id. at 818. The Court reasoned that reference to clearly established law did enough work:
“Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a constitutional right that had
not yet been declared, petitioners did not act with such disregard for the established law that their
conduct ‘cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.’” Id. at 819 n.33 (emphasis
added) (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978)).
205. Id. at 818.
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definition, the law was not clearly established at the time the officer acted.
This regime, in other words, “permits government officials to rely on the
old law.”206 It is designed to “protect[] all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.”207 In depriving the plaintiff of the
benefit of the new rule, it leads to precisely the same result that would
obtain if the Court had said that the new rule had only prospective effect.
Much obviously turns on the definition of “new,” and in subsequent
decisions, the Court confirmed it would define the concept to immunize
broad swaths of officer conduct. In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,208 for example,
the Court indicated that an officer would face liability only “if existing
precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.”209 Commentators note the Court’s “quiet” expansion of qualified
immunity through its definition of newness, its restriction of what
opinions can give rise to “clearly established” precedent, and its unusual
willingness to summarily reverse lower court opinions that withhold it.210
At the same time, the provenance and utility of qualified immunity are
currently a matter of considerable debate. Professor William Baude has
recently argued that the doctrine cannot be defended as a matter of
statutory interpretation, given that the good-faith defense lacked a
pedigree in 1871 before passage of § 1983.211 He has also pointed out that
the doctrine cannot be justified as a mechanism for redressing prior
unwarranted expansion of § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape,212 or as an extension

206. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 757 (1995).
207. Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotations
omitted).
208. 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
209. Id. at 740.
210. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 63–66 (2016) (noting the Court’s efforts to “covertly broaden[]” the
defense).
211. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 60 (2018);
Kinports, supra note 210, at 62 (noting that “the Court no longer engages in any pretense that its
qualified immunity rulings are interpreting the congressional intent underlying § 1983”). The Court,
per Justice Scalia, acknowledged in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), that it had
reformulated the doctrine to reflect principles “not at all embodied in the common law.” Id. at 645;
see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that qualified immunity is “no longer grounded in the
common-law backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act”).
212. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe approved the use of § 1983 as a federal remedy against state
officers who abused their official positions despite the availability of state-law remedies to plaintiff.
See id. at 172. “All agree” that, post-Monroe, § 1983 litigation has expanded greatly. RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 994
(7th ed. 2015).
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of the rule of lenity.213 Professor Joanna Schwartz conducted a study of
over a thousand cases and concluded that, in fact, qualified immunity “is
not achieving its policy objectives; the doctrine is unnecessary to protect
government officials from financial liability and ill suited to shield
government officials from discovery and trial in most filed cases.”214
Writing separately in Ziglar v. Abbasi,215 Justice Thomas cited many of
these concerns and urged that, “[i]n an appropriate case, we should
reconsider our qualified immunity jurisprudence.”216
Qualified immunity thus may not serve the ends traditionally invoked
to justify it. For the purposes at hand, though, the key aspect of qualified
immunity is what the Court thinks it is doing and what policies the Court
thinks it is vindicating. As the Court has underscored over time, the
purpose of requiring officers to pay money damages for violations of
constitutional rights—whether under § 1983 or Bivens—is to deter
misconduct.217 In this respect, damage actions are analogous to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule; both endeavor to create an incentive
structure that discourages bad conduct.218 Qualified immunity represents
a limit on how far the Court is willing to take that deterrent. In Harlow,
the Court acknowledged that overdeterrence imposes systemic costs:
penalizing officers too much may dampen both the officers’ “ardor”
necessary to enforce the law and their willingness to participate in law
enforcement in the first place.219 Where the rules are unclear or
unknowable, the deterrent value of assessing money damages against law

213. See Baude, supra note 211, at 66–69. Professor Baude calls this the “[t]wo wrongs . . . can
make a right” theory and traces it to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
611–12 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Baude, supra note 211, at 62–63, 74–77.
214. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 11 (2017).
215. 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
216. Id. at 1872 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
217. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations.”); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 485 (1994) (“It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.”); City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981) (affirming that “deterrence of future abuses
of power by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of § 1983”); Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (noting that Bivens actions represent a more effective deterrent than
suits against the government); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 100 YALE
L.J. 259, 266 (2000) (“Of course, awarding money damages for constitutional violations is intended
to deter. That is the point.”).
218. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–99 (2006) (comparing effectiveness of
exclusionary rule and civil actions for damages as deterrents). The Hudson Court characterized “extant
deterrences” against misconduct, including the threat of civil action, as “substantial.” Id. at 599.
219. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 487 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
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enforcement officers is questionable at best.220 Because the purpose is
deterrence, moreover, plaintiffs’ interests in reparations and claims of
possible injustice are subsidiary.221 The remedy sought by plaintiffs in
§ 1983 or Bivens actions—money damages—is the classic substitutionary
remedy that will neither reverse nor head off the constitutional harm.222
Through qualified immunity, the Court has struck a balance, opting to
penalize officers only for breaking old rules and to permit officials
“breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open
legal questions.”223
The doctrine of qualified immunity thus limits litigants’ ability to use
new rules after balancing the value of a deterrent remedy against the costs
it imposes. Where imposing a financial consequence after the fact
punishes, but will not effectively deter, qualified immunity circumscribes
the use of that mechanism to avert other negative systemic consequences.
Tinkering with the application of a new rule in order to achieve the
optimal balance between the express purpose of that new rule—deterrence
of misconduct—and legitimate reliance on settled rules, of course, is
exactly what the Court did under the Linkletter/Huson regime. Linkletter
itself examined the benefits of retroactive enforcement of Mapp’s
exclusionary-rule deterrent in pending appeals and final cases and
concluded that doing so would not deter officers from misconduct and
would impose wide-ranging, burdensome consequences.224 With the
doctrine of qualified immunity, the Court has engaged in the same
calculus and achieved a similar result. Rather than reflecting “special
federal policy considerations” unrelated to retroactivity,225 qualified
immunity is a horse of the same color.

220. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (recognizing that “a police officer is not charged
with predicting the future course of constitutional law”).
221. Cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (“[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims’
homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.”); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960) (discussing the exclusionary rule and noting that deterrent remedies are “calculated
to prevent, not to repair”).
222. See John M. Greabe, Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication, 62 BUFF. L. REV.
881, 907 (2014) (observing that monetary damages are “[t]he paradigmatic substitutionary remedy”).
223. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
224. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636–37; see supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
225. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 757–58 (1995).
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Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

To understand the relevance of the good-faith exception to adjudicative
retroactivity, it is necessary to backtrack briefly. In United States v.
Leon,226 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule
does not apply where an officer relied in good faith on a search warrant
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate that was later found to lack
probable cause.227 The Court started with the proposition that the
exclusionary rule is a “judicially created remedy” that exacts “substantial
social costs.”228 It then examined the utility of the exclusionary rule as a
deterrent under the circumstances and found little, if any, marginal value
to exclusion of evidence where an officer had acted reasonably; the
officer’s conduct was definitionally beyond reproach, and it was unlikely
that exclusion of evidence would have deterrent value against a neutral
and detached magistrate.229 The fundamental takeaway from Leon was
that the value of a deterrent varies with the culpability of the underlying
conduct.230 Over time, the Court has extended this good-faith reliance
exception to situations in which officers relied reasonably on
subsequently invalidated statutes,231 erroneous information in a database
of arrests maintained by judicial employees,232 and mistaken information
in databases of warrants.233
Davis v. United States, decided in 2011, extended the Leon rule further
to situations where an officer relied in good faith on an existing judicial
precedent—an “old” rule—that was invalidated by another decision
during the pendency of defendant’s appeal. The Court, per Justice Alito,
again found “the acknowledged absence of culpability” on the part of the
police officer dispositive.234 Examining the deterrent value of the
exclusionary rule where the officer had relied on binding precedent, the
Court found that “[a]bout all that exclusion would deter in this case is
conscientious police work.”235 The Court concluded, “[i]t is one thing for
226. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
227. Id. at 919–21.
228. Id. at 906–07 (citations omitted).
229. Id. at 916–17.
230. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (“When the police exhibit “deliberate,”
‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of
exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.” (citation omitted)).
231. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987).
232. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995).
233. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145–46 (2009).
234. Davis, 546 U.S. at 230.
235. Id. at 241.
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the criminal ‘to go free because the constable has blundered.’ It is quite
another to set the criminal free because the constable has scrupulously
adhered to governing law.”236
Along the way, the majority encountered, and rebuffed, the dissent’s
protests that the holding violated principles of adjudicative
retroactivity.237 Citing Griffith, a dissenting Justice Breyer argued that “[a]
new ‘good faith’ exception and this Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence are
incompatible.”238 Justice Breyer noted that the Court’s decision amounted
to a categorical exception from settled principles of retroactivity, one that
gave rise to a “Linkletter-like result.”239 Unmoved, the majority charged
the dissent with “conflat[ing] what are two distinct doctrines.”240 Per
Griffith, the new rule “applies retroactively to this case;”241 however,
given the operation of an independent doctrine, the defendant was not
entitled to a remedy. Recognition of a new good-faith exception, the Court
concluded, “neither contravenes Griffith nor denies retroactive effect to
[the new rule].”242
In the Fourth Amendment context, after Davis, a litigant cannot claim
the benefit of a new rule announced during the pendency of his appeal to
exclude wrongfully seized evidence. This is so because “[e]xcluding
evidence in such cases deters no police misconduct and imposes
substantial social costs.”243 Instrumental in the Davis Court’s analysis
were the following observations: (1) the officer had justifiably relied on
the old rule;244 (2) the purpose of the new rule—mandating exclusion of
evidence to deter misconduct—would not be served;245 (3) the defendant
had no skin in the game given that the exclusionary rule operates as “a
windfall” serving other purposes;246 and (4) any other result would
“exact[] a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large.”247

236. Id. at 249 (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926)).
237. Id. at 243–45.
238. Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 255.
240. Id. at 243 (majority opinion).
241. Id. at 244.
242. Id. See generally Beske, supra note 17, at 844 (arguing that after Davis, retroactivity gives
rise to a duty to grapple with new rules that is defeasible by several “independent” doctrines).
243. Davis, 564 U.S. at 249.
244. Id. (finding the officer’s reliance “objectively reasonable”).
245. Id. at 241 (concluding that penalizing the officer in this context “cannot logically contribute
to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations” (citation omitted)).
246. Id. at 248.
247. Id. at 237.
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Disdaining Linkletter, the Court nonetheless engaged in Linkletter
balancing, considered every Linkletter factor, and reached the identical
result for identical reasons.
C.

The Doctrine of Forfeiture

Another way the Court has increasingly moderated the everything-isretroactive approach is through robust use of procedural mechanisms like
forfeiture.248 Forfeiture, which is usually inadvertent, differs from waiver,
which is an “intentional relinquishment” of a known right.249 A defendant
forfeits an objection when his lawyer fails to raise it in a timely fashion
before the tribunal that has jurisdiction to decide it.250 The doctrine of
forfeiture is designed to foster efficiency by incentivizing defendants and
counsel to present claims at the appropriate place and time.251 A timely
lodged objection may eliminate error altogether by providing a trial judge
the opportunity to correct it, or may at least inspire the trial judge to create
a more developed record.252
A court will review an issue notwithstanding a criminal defendant’s
failure to object when the error is “plain.”253 Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(b) codifies this exception, allowing that “[a] plain error that
affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not
brought to the court’s attention.”254 The Court circumscribed the plain
error category further by requiring that the error must “seriously affect[]
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”255
The Court first hinted at the use of forfeiture rules to preclude
application of a new rule announced after trial in Hankerson v. North
Carolina.256 Hankerson addressed the retroactivity of Mullaney v.
248. See generally Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 21, at 942–53 (discussing
use of forfeiture in lieu of nonretroactivity to mitigate disruptive impact of changes in the law).
249. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
(1993) (“Waiver is different from forfeiture.”).
250. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944).
251. See Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 21, at 956 (“Forfeiture doctrines
encourage adherence to claim-presentation rules by imposing a sanction when parties fail to do so.”).
252. See id. at 958.
253. The Court indicated in Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941), and echoed in Olano,
that “[a] rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of review would
invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously
been specifically urged would be out of harmony with . . . the rules of fundamental justice.” Olano,
507 U.S. at 732.
254. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
255. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736–37.
256. 432 U.S. 233 (1977); id. at 244 n.8.
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Wilbur,257 a case that struck down a state requirement that a defendant
affirmatively prove provocation in order to reduce his conviction from
murder to manslaughter.258 In Hankerson, which arose during the
Linkletter/Huson era, the Court rejected North Carolina’s effort to restrict
Mullaney to prospective effect, holding that retroactive effect was
required because the Mullaney rule corrected an error that “substantially
impairs the truth-finding function.”259 The Court then noted, offhandedly
and in a footnote, that its decision would not give rise to significant
disruption because the states “may be able to insulate past convictions by
enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury
instruction is a waiver of any claim of error.”260
Several cases took up this suggestion that procedural rules might
mitigate the effects of a full retroactivity regime after Griffith. In Johnson
v. United States,261 Johnson appealed her perjury conviction on the basis
that the judge, not the jury, had decided the question of materiality in
violation of United States v. Gaudin,262 a case handed down after her
trial.263 The trial judge had acted in accord with then-binding circuit
precedent, and neither Johnson nor her attorney had objected at trial.
Despite the contemporaneous futility of lodging this objection, a
unanimous Court,264 per Chief Justice Rehnquist, reviewed for plain error
under Olano.265 Citing Griffith, pursuant to which Gaudin had retroactive
effect, the Court found error.266 It then agreed with Johnson that it would
assess the obviousness of the error at the time of appeal rather than at
trial.267 Turning to whether the error affected “substantial rights,” the
Court expressed skepticism about Johnson’s argument that the trial
court’s error was plain because it was “structural”—analogous to total
257. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
258. Id. at 703–04.
259. Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 242.
260. Id. at 244 n.8. The Court did not speculate about the possible intersection of its conclusion
that the Mullaney error impaired confidence in the verdict and the concept of plain error, but its
subsequent decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), that defective reasonable doubt
instructions represent “structural error,” suggests that plain error analysis may no longer be suitable
on Mullaney-type facts. Id. at 281–82; see infra note 299 and accompanying text.
261. 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
262. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
263. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 464.
264. Justice Scalia did not join the portions of the opinion addressing whether the error was obvious
and expressing doubt that the error was structural. Id. at 462.
265. Id. at 466–70.
266. Id. at 467 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).
267. Id. at 467–68.
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deprivation of counsel, lack of an impartial trial judge, exclusion of jurors
of the defendant’s race from the grand jury pool, and the like.268 The Court
decided that it did not need to answer that question definitively given its
conclusion that the error did not “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”269 Evidence against Johnson
on materiality was “overwhelming,” so much so that she had not really
put up a defense at trial.270 Under the circumstances, given her obvious
guilt, the Court had no trouble upholding her conviction.271 Five years
later, in United States v. Cotton,272 the Court considered whether a
defendant who had not objected at trial could raise a claim under Apprendi
v. New Jersey,273 a case rendered subsequent to his conviction.274 A
unanimous Court, again per Chief Justice Rehnquist, reviewed for plain
error under Olano and again agreed that the error was manifest and
obvious.275 As in Johnson, the Court expressed doubt that the claimed
error was structural but then proceeded to find resolution of that question
unnecessary given “overwhelming” and “essentially uncontroverted”
evidence of Cotton’s guilt.276
Based on Johnson and Cotton, a leading treatise opined that “it is not
clear what showing other than innocence would warrant relief.”277 Last
term, though, the Court found a little more flexibility in the standard in
Rosales-Mireles v. United States.278 An error in the probation office’s
268. Id. at 468–69. The “structural error” concept emerged in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279
(1991). Writing for the Court in that portion of his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist differentiated
between “trial error[s],” as to which harmless error analysis applied, and “structural defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.” Id. at 309–
10 (internal quotation marks omitted). He cited total deprivation of the right to counsel, a biased judge,
and exclusion of black jurors from the grand jury pool as examples of such defects. Id.
269. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469–70.
270. Id. at 470.
271. The Court concluded, in fact, that reversing her conviction would have an unsettling effect,
“encourag[ing] litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestir[ring] the public to ridicule it.” Id.
(quoting R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 50 (1970)).
272. 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
273. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi was a groundbreaking case holding that a trial court could only
rely on facts decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in enhancing a defendant’s sentence. See
id. at 490. The decision imperiled then-prevailing federal and state sentencing practices all over the
country. See Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 21, at 935 (observing that, as of
December 2005, the case had been cited over thirteen thousand times).
274. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627.
275. Id. at 631–32.
276. Id. at 633.
277. 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.5(d) (4th ed. 2018). The authors
speculated that perhaps some structural errors might qualify. Id. at n.159.
278. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018).
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report double-counted petitioner’s prior state misdemeanor conviction, so
the sentencing judge relied on an incorrect, higher sentencing range.279
The Fifth Circuit interpreted Olano’s “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” standard to require
an error that “shock[s] the conscience of the common man, serve[s] as a
powerful indictment against our system of justice or seriously call[s] into
question the competence or integrity of the district judge.”280 The Court,
per Justice Sotomayor, reversed, characterizing the Fifth Circuit’s
standard as “unduly restrictive.”281 The Court distinguished Johnson and
Cotton and found that “public legitimacy of our justice system” depends
on correcting errors that likely increased the amount of time an individual
is incarcerated.282
The post-Griffith Court has made emphatically clear that it knows it is
using the Olano test as a mechanism for limiting the disruptive effect of
sea change in the law to a small subset of cases pending on direct review.
United States v. Booker,283 which rendered the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines advisory, arguably “meant that virtually every federal sentence
handed down during the last twenty years had been imposed in an illegal
fashion.”284 The Court acknowledged that under Griffith, its decision
“must apply” to all cases on direct review.285 However, the Court said that
every appeal would not necessitate resentencing because “[it] expect[ed]
reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for
example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the
‘plain-error’ test.”286
Others have very persuasively demonstrated that use of plain error in
the new-rule context cannot be justified by the traditional purposes of
forfeiture;287 forfeiture is an ill-fitting suit that clothes a basic instinct that

279. Id. at 1905.
280. United States v. Rosales-Mireles, 850 F.3d 246, 249–50 (5th Cir. 2017).
281. Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1906.
282. Id. at 1908–09, 1908 n.3.
283. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
284. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 21, at 940; see also Heytens, The
Framework(s), supra note 18, at 607.
285. Booker, 543 U.S. at 268.
286. Id. The Booker Court also indicated that it expected application of the harmless error doctrine
would confine the number of situations in which resentencing was necessary. Id. Harmless error is
discussed in Section II.D, infra.
287. See Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments, supra note 21, at 955–65 (arguing that
forfeiture’s primary purpose—”promot[ing] compliance with claim-presentation rules”—is not
served by incentivizing lawyers to make objections precluded by existing law); Meir Katz, Plainly
Not “Error”: Adjudicative Retroactivity on Direct Review, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1979, 2025–27
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not every claimant who can demonstrate that a new rule taints a prior
conviction should get relief. What matters for present purposes, though,
is not whether use of plain error in this context is a good or legally
defensible idea. The key inquiry for purposes of this article is which
defendants, under the Court’s test, get the benefit of a new rule and under
what circumstances. Where an objection is plainly foreclosed by existing
precedent, it is safe to assume that attorneys lodging a futile objection will
be few and far between. The majority of potential claimants, then, will
face forfeiture analysis and review for plain error, as the Court predicted
in Booker.
Given Johnson, no “new rule” claimant will falter on the requirement
that an error exist or be “plain.”288 The key hang-ups are whether it
“affect[s] substantial rights” and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 289 As noted, the Court has
repeatedly dodged the question what errors, other than errors undermining
confidence in the underlying guilt-innocence determination, “affect[]
substantial rights.”290 In Johnson, the defendant tried unsuccessfully to
argue that a judge deciding the materiality question, rather than a jury,
was a “structural error” that thereby affected her substantial rights.291 The
skeptical Court was not impressed with her argument, noting that it had
found structural errors “only in a very limited class of cases,” including
deprivation of the right to counsel, a biased trial judge, exclusion of grand
jurors of defendant’s race from the pool, denial of right to selfrepresentation, denial of a public trial, and flawed reasonable doubt
instructions.292 It is probably safe to assume that a litigant raising an error
that can fit within this “very limited class of cases”—if in fact it is possible
that a newly recognized error can fit within this category293—will be able
(2004) (arguing that use of plain error in this context undermines the core principles underlying
adjudicative retroactivity).
288. The Court buttressed this point in Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266 (2013), where it
underscored that the time for determining “plainness” of an error is the time of appellate review, not
the time of trial. Id. at 276–77.
289. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1901 (2018) (quoting MolinaMartinez v. United States, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)).
290. Id. at 1903.
291. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997).
292. Id.
293. The right to counsel, enshrined in Gideon v. Wainwright, surfaces both on this list and as the
paradigmatic example of a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure” that is an exception to Teague v.
Lane’s no-retroactivity-on-habeas maxim. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007). The
Court has not clarified the relationship between structural errors and watershed rules, but it does bear
mention that since Teague, the Court has not recognized a single new rule that fits within the
“watershed rule” category. See Eighth Amendment–Retroactivity of New Constitutional Rules –
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to satisfy this criterion, but then she must proceed to the next step. As
Johnson and Cotton reflect, thus far, the Court has been reluctant to make
such a finding when evidence of guilt is “overwhelming.” 294
Consideration of guilt and innocence thus seems central to the inquiry of
which defendants get to claim the benefit of a new rule. Those defendants
who can show an error that calls into question the factual basis for their
conviction have a theoretical ability to surmount the plain error hurdle.
So, too, after Rosales-Mireles, defendants who can establish that they face
extra time in prison due to a sentencing error seem to be on solid footing.
Through use of forfeiture, the Court has taken a potential mountain of
follow-on cases pending on direct review and cut down its size
dramatically, thus blunting the impact of any change in the rules. Recall
the dichotomy drawn in the Linkletter regime between prophylactic
procedural rules and rules bearing materially on the guilt-innocence
determination and the integrity of the system.295 The former rules—
Miranda-type overcorrections or mere procedural rules, violations of
which do not necessarily undermine confidence in any particular
conviction—had prospective effect, aside from the litigants in whose
cases the rules were established.296 The latter rules—those that recognized
key rights and protections, violations of which called the underlying guiltinnocence determination into question—applied retroactively.297
Except where a rule is “structural,” today’s Court is more likely to
proceed on a case-by-case, rather than categorical, basis. That said, the
same results generally obtain now as during the Linkletter era.298 Aside
from the presumptively rare defendant whose counsel lodges a futile
Juvenile Sentencing – Montgomery v. Louisiana, 130 HARV. L. REV. 377, 383–84 (2016) (“In twentyseven years, the Court has never declared a new procedural rule ‘watershed.’”). It is quite possible
that the Court may keep dodging the question whether new structural errors “affect[] substantial
rights” by refusing to recognize new structural error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). But see United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (finding in harmless error case that deprivation of counsel
of one’s choice is structural error).
294. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633 (2002); Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470.
295. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text.
298. In Hankerson, the Court held that Mullaney had to have retroactive effect because it
invalidated a burden-shifting mechanism that “substantially” impaired the truth-finding function at
trial. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1977). Although the Court’s suggestion
that forfeiture might have a role to play in mitigating the number of affected cases is certainly in
tension with that finding, see id. at 244 n.8, the Court’s subsequent conclusion in Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993), that defective reasonable doubt instructions are “structural
error” and harmful per se probably retracts the idea that forfeiture has a role to play in the Mullaney
case. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) (citing Sullivan as a structural error
case in the course of its plain error analysis).
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objection precluded by the existing, old rule, defendants do not get the
benefit of a new rule if its violation does not undermine confidence in
their convictions or sentences. In contrast, those who can demonstrate that
the error was outcome-determinative, and possibly those raising structural
errors that go to the very legitimacy of our criminal justice system,
conceivably may obtain the benefit of a new rule. Through use of
forfeiture, as mitigated by plain error, the post-Griffith Court has struck a
similar balance as obtained in the Linkletter regime, and we end not far
from where we started.
D.

Harmless Error Analysis

The Court in United States v. Booker299 cited harmless error analysis as
an additional mechanism that might cut down on the systemic impact of
according its decision retroactive effect.300 While forfeiture and plain error
analysis apply where the defendant fails to object at trial, harmless error
analysis applies where the defendant makes a timely and appropriate
objection. In the new rule context, this mechanism picks up, and delimits,
the already-presumptively-small category of cases where an attorney
objected in the face of an old rule that precluded that objection.
In Chapman v. California,301 the Court held that constitutional errors
do not require automatic reversal where a reviewing court can conclude
they were “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”302 The Court allowed,
however, that there might be some rights so fundamental to systemic
integrity that their violation could not be harmless.303 These include the
“structural errors” identified in Johnson v. United States304—deprivation
of the right to counsel, a biased trial judge, exclusion of grand jurors of
defendant’s race from the pool, denial of right to self-representation,

299. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
300. Id. at 268.
301. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Professor Greabe describes Chapman and its progeny as “taming
influences in the criminal procedure field” that reduced the impact of the Warren Court’s expansion
of constitutional protections. John M. Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless Error Revisited, 54 HOUS. L.
REV. 59, 71 (2016).
302. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
303. Id. at 23 n.8; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (stating that these structural
errors “affect substantial rights”).
304. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991) (holding that coerced confessions are not structural errors and are subject to
harmless error analysis).
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denial of a public trial, and flawed reasonable doubt instructions.305 In
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,306 the Court added “erroneous
deprivation of the right to counsel of choice” to this list.307
Harmless error analysis existed and was used to moderate the effects
of dramatic legal change during the Linkletter regime, so its use today to
circumscribe the number of litigants who can obtain the benefit of a new
rule is not novel. As in the forfeiture context, the key point here is that the
litigants who can surmount this hurdle are either those who raise structural
errors going to the very basic and vital underpinnings of the judicial
system or those in whose cases the error may have made a difference in
the guilt-innocence or sentencing determination. Harmless error analysis
compels application of a new rule only where the individual or systemic
stakes are high. In that respect, the harmless error doctrine, too, reinforces
the balance struck by the Court during the Linkletter regime.
E.

Remedial Discretion in Refund Cases

As previously noted, proponents of Huson balancing generally
preferred to spare state treasuries the catastrophic effects of mandatory
refunds and invoked prospectivity in order to get there.308 Thus, in Arizona
Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris,309 Justice O’Connor, the deciding vote,
invoked Huson to avert a backward-looking refund order that would
deplete state pension funds on which “[m]any working men and women
[had] based their retirement decisions.”310 She sounded a similar refrain
in her four-justice plurality in American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith.311
Chief among the concerns of Huson proponents was the threat of
catastrophic refund orders that might unfairly penalize states that had
relied on old rules, thereby distorting state policymaking, and this risk
repeatedly inclined them to prospectivity.
The Court’s decisions in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia and
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation rejected the Huson balancing
305. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49, 149 n.4 (2006) (observing that
structural errors “defy analysis by harmless error standards” because of “the difficulty of assessing
the effect of the error” (citation omitted)).
306. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
307. Id. at 150.
308. See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
309. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam).
310. Id. at 1110 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
311. 496 U.S. 167, 182 (1990) (plurality opinion) (noting that burden of imposing unexpected tax
refund liability on states would pose substantial inequity and threaten to deplete state treasuries).
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framework, but it is worth pausing for a moment to examine the remedial
flexibility the Court painstakingly laid out, which had the effect, going
forward, of permitting states to avoid the systemic burden of unforeseen
refunds. The Harper Court soundly rejected the idea that the new rule
would have prospective effect but noted that “federal law does not
necessarily entitle [petitioners] to a refund.”312 States would have future
flexibility to insulate themselves from refund liability by putting into
place a pre-deprivation challenge scheme, pursuant to which taxpayers
could challenge the tax before paying it.313 This pre-deprivation scheme,
the Court noted, was a sufficient safeguard to comport with due process.314
If a state did not have such a scheme in place, it could do one of two things
to cure a discriminatory tax scheme: either refund the wrongfullycollected taxes or “issue some other order that ‘create[s] in hindsight a
nondiscriminatory scheme,”315 presumably by assessing in-state actors
not previously taxed. In its rejection of prospectivity, the Court thus set
out a blueprint for states to avoid the burdensome possibility of refunds.
The remedial discretion invoked by the Court served to mitigate the
disruptive systemic effects of the Court’s tax decisions.
F.

Tying it All Together (Mostly): Balancing Through the Backdoor

The outcome of balancing in the Linkletter/Huson era was largely
dependent on the Court’s characterization of the underlying interests.316
In the criminal context, where the right under consideration significantly
enhanced the reliability of the guilt-innocence determination in a
particular case, the Court generally made its new rules retroactive. Where,
in contrast, the rule served purposes other than protecting the defendant,
like deterrence, the Court generally did not.317 Intuitively, the Court
recognized that there is a benefit to allowing law enforcement to rely on
old rules and doctrinal repose and that this benefit should only be
overcome when necessary to avert significant injustice.318 In the civil
context, the same instincts applied. The Court generally made new rules
prospective where individual actors had reasonably relied to their

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 83, 100 (1993).
Id. at 101 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 38 n.21).
Id.
Id. (citing McKesson, 496 U.S. at 40).
See supra notes 77–88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text.
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detriment, particularly when it found that the systemic impact of
retroactive effect would be significantly disruptive.319
Though courts and academics frequently depict the post-Griffith and
Harper landscape in terms suggesting it represents a profound change, in
reality it does not look markedly different. In the criminal context, law
enforcement can generally rely on settled rules through use of good-faith
reliance. The Court has justified this by examining the purpose of the
underlying right and found the additional deterrent value of judging past
conduct by new rule metrics does not warrant the significant disruption of
freeing guilty defendants. 320 Where the right is characterized in individual
terms, rather than in terms of deterrence, the Court has used forfeiture and
harmless error to ensure that only significant claims—those that call the
guilt-innocence determination into question or are otherwise fundamental
to the structure of our system—merit retroactive effect.321 In the criminal
context, in other words, the same results appear to obtain after Griffith as
obtained in the Linkletter universe. Though it has deemed these methods
“independent,” moreover, the Court has adverted to the same modes of
analysis in getting there, assessing the purpose of the underlying rights
and balancing them against the burdens that might be imposed by the new
rule.
In the civil context, the same results generally, though not invariably,
hold. Like good-faith reliance in the criminal context, qualified immunity
comes into play to afford officials leeway to rely on clearly settled rules.
The Court has seen the underlying damage actions as mechanisms for
deterring official misconduct, and qualified immunity represents a
limitation: where the marginal benefits of deterrence appear insubstantial,
it makes sense to avoid ancillary disruptive effects. 322 In the refund
context, the Court has insisted upon retroactivity post-Harper but has
provided states a blueprint for how to avoid the disruptive effect of ex post
tax liability by setting up pre-deprivation process. Although the
mechanism is slightly different, the Court has set up a system whereby the
same result can readily obtain, for the same reasons of averting
disruption.323
The outlier in this construct, and admitted fly in the ointment, is
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, pursuant to which Hyde would have

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 242–246 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 299, 302–308 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 216–224 and accompanying text.
See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
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prevailed in the Huson era given nearly identical statute-of-limitations
facts. The Ohio Supreme Court had recognized the rule of Harper but
found room to “tailor [its] own remedies” in determining “the manner in
which the [U.S.] Supreme Court opinion is to be retroactively applied.”324
The underlying right of action favored the seriously injured plaintiff, who
had reasonably relied to her detriment on a longer statute of limitations.325
Holding the defendant to the statute of limitations that applied at the time
of the injury-causing conduct, moreover, could not have been perceived
as manifestly unfair. Indeed, the Reynoldsville Casket Company received
a windfall through retroactive application of the statute-of-limitationsshortening rule. Straightforward application of balancing—weighing the
interests at stake against the burden of prospective or retroactive
application—thus would have dictated a verdict for Hyde.
The Court, however, would not go there and instead brandished a
defiant Harper flag.326 Perhaps, having finally found five votes for the
rejection of selective prospectivity in Harper two years before, the Court
was wary that there would be no cabining principle to contain full-scale
resurrection of Huson balancing. Although Hyde alluded to traditional
equitable tolling, her counsel did not propose any containment, any
“special reason,” that Harper should not apply that would not also
mandate prospective application in the next case.327 In fact, her counsel’s
argument was marked by the following interchange:
TIMOTHY B. DYK: Well, I think that Ohio is entitled to make
the choice, as it does routinely and across the board. It is not
discriminating against the Federal right. It is simply deciding a
remedial issue.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But discriminating or not, it is in effect
ruling that the Ohio constitution can make the Bendix decision
prospective only in Ohio. That’s the effect of it, is it not?
TIMOTHY B. DYK: That is the effect of it, but not as a choiceof-law matter, as a remedial matter of saying that where people
are surprised—

324. Hyde v. Reynoldsville Casket Co., 626 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ohio 1994).
325. Id. at 77.
326. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 754 (1995) (“If Harper has anything
more than symbolic significance, how could virtually identical reliance, without more, prove
sufficient to permit a virtually identical denial simply because it is characterized as a denial based on
‘remedy’ rather than ‘non-retroactivity’?”).
327. Id. at 759.
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JUSTICE GINSBURG: Whatever label you put on it, the result is
a prospective application of a decision that this Court declared to
be fully retroactive.328
There are reasons why the Court may have balked at finding a way for
Hyde to pursue her lawsuit. In all likelihood, it may have been “too soon”
to bring such an overt and unlimited Harper workaround to the table.
Reynoldsville Casket admittedly represents one area in which the results
of Huson balancing do not currently obtain.
Reynoldsville Casket notwithstanding, the Court generally has—in the
Linkletter/Huson era and thereafter—attempted to soften the impact of its
ground-breaking decisions, avoiding disruption except where necessary
in the interests of justice. During the Linkletter/Huson era, the Court made
its calculus overt. Subsequently, the Court has been intent on deploying
“distinct doctrines”329 that it claims have “nothing to do with
retroactivity”330 to achieve much the same outcomes by considering—and
balancing—many of the same criteria.
Setting aside the underappreciated benefits of acknowledging what it
is doing more forthrightly, the Court’s impulses, both before and after its
official embrace of adjudicative retroactivity, are salutary and important
for the Court as an institution. Simply put, “[t]he Court’s power . . . lies
in its legitimacy.”331 This legitimacy depends to a significant degree on
public acceptance.332 Legal rules attach consequences to primary conduct,
and we structure basic life decisions around them. Legal rules may
change, but “[t]he principle that the legal effect of conduct should
ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took
place has timeless and universal human appeal.”333 Predictability in how
the rules apply, and some protection from adverse post hoc consequences
328. Oral Argument at 45:00, Reynoldsville Casket Co., 514 U.S. 749 (No. 94-3),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-3 (last visited May 1, 2019).
329. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243 (2011).
330. Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 758–59.
331. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992).
332. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1840–
41 (2005); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 745 (1982) (“Rules
are not rules unless they are authoritative, and that authority can only be conferred by a community.”).
333. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia was addressing the retroactive effect of legislation, rather than judicial opinions.
However, inasmuch as federal judges are not elected, the unfairness of judges retroactively changing
the rules governing primary conduct gives rise to even greater institutional legitimacy concerns. See
Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 722 (1994)
(observing that the Court is uniquely vulnerable given that it is not elected and lacks power to coerce
compliance).
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for reasonable reliance on old rules, is a systemic necessity that gives
effect to “enduring notions of what is fair.”334 The Court has generally
given effect to this intuition by shielding people from adverse
consequences of obeying existing rules.
III. ON THE HORIZON: RETROACTIVITY IN THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CONTEXT
The Court’s struggle to reconcile its dueling impulses to soften the
blow of disruptive legal change and adhere to principles of adjudicative
retroactivity is likely to erupt again soon in a new context. It is interesting
to consider how the Court might look at the problem and whether it
presents fertile ground for another “distinct doctrine” that effectively
precludes retroactive effect.
After decades of doctrinal repose, the Court has decided three
significant Appointments Clause335 cases in the past eight years.336 Most
recently, in Lucia v. SEC, the Court held that the SEC’s administrative
law judges are “Officers of the United States” subject to the Appointments
Clause.337 Based on this conclusion, the Court ordered that the petitioner
receive a new hearing before a different, properly-appointed ALJ.338 As
commentators have noted, it will be difficult to cabin this decision to SEC
ALJs, and the Court’s rationale is likely to reach the more than 1600
federal ALJs who work in the Social Security Administration339 and who,
according to agency statistics, handle upwards of 650,000 hearings a
334. Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 855–56 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally Jill E. Fisch,
Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1106 (1997)
(arguing that commitment to stability of old rules fosters respect for the legal system).
335. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
336. See Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S.
__, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477
(2015). See generally Metzger, supra note 26, at 1608–09 (noting significant recent work in this area
after “two decades [when] these issues had lain largely judicially dormant”).
337. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.
338. Id. at 2055.
339. See Alan Morrison, Symposium: Lucia v. SEC – More Questions than Answers,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2018, 8:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-lucia-vsec-more-questions-than-answers/ [https://perma.cc/H2U3-8BHV] (“Most of the federal ALJs sit on
Social Security Administration cases (over 1,650 out of 1,926), for which it is much less likely that
appointments clause objections were preserved, but given the number of cases they have, even a
relative few will be bad news for the agency.”); Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Worry
About Politicizing Administrative Law Judges, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 23, 2018, 5:33 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/04/argument-analysis-justices-worry-about-politicizingadministrative-law-judges/ [https://perma.cc/3LU9-XTRZ] (noting that several justices seemed
skeptical about confining the question to the 150 SEC ALJs).
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year.340 With each new case likely to precipitate many more,341 the Court
will be challenged to articulate a mechanism for confining the systemic
disruptions of its handiwork. Lucia did not have to deal with the aftereffects of its result, but the issue will surface, and it is worth examining
how it may play out in light of the Court’s impulses in other contexts.
Litigants raising Appointments Clause challenges differ in significant
respects from other litigants. The Court has long permitted regulated
parties to raise separation of powers challenges to the composition of
federal administrative agencies.342 However, these structural challenges
rest uneasily with conventional Article III standing, which traditionally
rejects assertion of generalized grievances and requires a demonstration
of concrete, particularized injury.343 Notwithstanding familiar standing
precepts, federal courts have consistently afforded litigants subject to
agency action standing to assert separation of powers claims even when
they cannot show a connection between their claim and any adverse action
against them.344 In other words, courts have not required litigants to
demonstrate that a properly-constituted tribunal would have rendered a
different decision.345
In a sense, courts have conferred standing by necessity in this context
in recognition that other mechanisms for vindication of structural harm

340. Information About SSA’s Hearings and Appeals Operations, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_us.html [https://perma.cc/Y7MF-2MWY].
341. Jennifer Mascott, Symposium: The Appointments Clause—a Modest Take, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 22, 2018, 3:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-the-appointmentsclause-a-modest-take/ [https://perma.cc/6BJC-DV2A] (noting that “it seems likely that appointments
clause scholars and practitioners will be productively employed for at least a few more years”).
342. See generally Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in
Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 490–96 (2014) (noting expanding ranks of
plaintiffs raising structural challenges).
343. “Individuals have ‘no standing to complain simply that their Government is violating the
law.’” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225 (2011) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755
(1984)). Instead, they must show “actual or imminent harm that is concrete and particular, fairly
traceable to the conduct complained of, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (citing
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
344. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533 (1962) (“The claim advanced by the petitioners,
that they were denied the protection of [Article III] judges . . . has nothing to do with the manner in
which either of these judges conducted himself in these proceedings.”); FEC v. NRA Political Victory
Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) (“A litigant ‘is not
required to show that he has received less favorable treatment than he would have if the agency were
lawfully constituted and otherwise authorized to discharge its functions.’”). See generally Barnett,
supra note 342, at 495 (observing that courts ignore questions of harm in this context).
345. See Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1495–96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that litigants raising
structural challenges can “rarely or never” show actual harm).
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have considerable flaws. The ancient writ of quo warranto,346 which
enables a private citizen to vindicate the public interest by directly
challenging an officer’s authority, is accompanied by a gauntlet of
procedures that has made it “an extremely difficult and uncertain remedy”
for structural claims.347 Perhaps recognizing the inutility of other vehicles
for vindicating structural norms, the Court has not only permitted
symbolic (as opposed to concrete) harm but has been quite overt about
fashioning remedies to provide appropriate incentive to litigants.348 In
Ryder v. United States,349 the Court noted that it had to provide a remedy
in the event of violation of the Appointments Clause because “[a]ny other
rule would create a disincentive” to bring such challenges.350 Most
recently, in Lucia, the Court ordered that Raymond Lucia have a new
hearing before a different ALJ in order to “create ‘[]incentive[s] to raise
Appointments Clause challenges.’”351 That the Court feels the need to
incentivize litigants to raise structural challenges highlights that these
litigants play a somewhat different role than conventional litigants,
possibly serving public interests as much or more than their own.352 In
Bond v. United States,353 the Court forthrightly acknowledged some
dependence on these individual litigants, noting that, “[i]n the precedents
of this Court, the claims of individuals—not of Government
departments—have been the principal source of judicial decisions
concerning separation of powers and checks and balances.”354
During the period before Griffith and Harper mandated full
retroactivity, the Court was able to balance its interest in this incentive
against the reality that invalidating every action of an improperly
constituted or appointed agency actor could occasion major disruption. In
practice, therefore, the Court would give relief to the litigants before it

346. Quo warranto is a common-law writ that inquires into the authority of a public office-holder.
See Quo Warranto, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
347. Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1498. The Andrade court noted many issues with quo warranto that
would “effectively bar . . . access to court.” Id.
348. Barnett, supra note 342, at 509–12 (noting that courts must hold out remedies so that rational
litigants have incentive to advance structural claims).
349. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
350. Id. at 183.
351. Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 n.5 (2018) (quoting Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183).
352. See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a Private Attorney General Is—And Why it
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2144–45 (2004) (describing “substitute” private attorneys general,
like qui tam relators, who are given private incentives to advance public policies).
353. 564 U.S. 211 (2011).
354. Id. at 222.
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while according other actions of the agency de facto validity.355 In
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, for example,
a plurality of the Court held that bankruptcy courts lacked authority to
adjudicate certain private claims but made its opinion selectively
prospective to avoid “substantial injustice and hardship.356 In Buckley v.
Valeo,357 the Court determined that Commissioners of the Federal
Election Commission were “Officers of the United States” whose
appointments had violated the U.S. Constitution358 but concluded that this
defect should not affect the validity of the Commission’s actions to date
and accorded those actions “de facto validity.”359
The Court’s first reckoning with the post-Harper import of adjudicative
retroactivity principles in this context suggested it was inclined to take a
harder line. In Ryder v. United States, a member of the Coast Guard
convicted by court martial challenged the appointment of two civilian
judges on the Court of Military Review.360 Agreeing with his substantive
challenge and finding an Appointments Clause violation, the Court of
Military Appeals nonetheless affirmed his conviction—thus providing
him no remedy—citing Buckley v. Valeo and the “de facto officer
doctrine” to insulate the officers’ appointment from challenge
altogether.361 In seeking to defend this decision before the Supreme Court,
the government again cited the de facto officer doctrine and added Husonstyle “pure prospectivity” for good measure.362 The Supreme Court
rejected each and reversed.363 The Court correctly observed that, because
the litigants in Buckley and Northern Pipeline had received the relief that
they sought, neither case had in fact relied on the “de facto officer

355. De facto validity as used here is distinct from the “de facto officer doctrine,” which “limits an
individual’s ‘ability to challenge governmental action on the ground that the officers taking that action
are improperly in office.’” Kathryn A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The Case for
Continued Application, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1985) (quoting Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d
1475, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The de facto officer doctrine would preclude Appointments Clause
challenges altogether; in Northern Pipeline and Buckley, the Court granted relief to the litigants, thus
permitting the claim, but invoked “de facto validity” to make its decisions otherwise prospective.
356. N. Pipe Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50, 87–88 (1982).
357. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
358. Id. at 140–41.
359. Id. at 142 (emphasis omitted).
360. 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995).
361. Id. at 180 (emphasis omitted). For the important distinction between “de facto validity” and
the “de facto officer doctrine,” see supra note 355.
362. Id. at 183–85.
363. Id. at 188.
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doctrine.”364 Instead, Northern Pipeline and Buckley had granted relief
and invoked a different doctrine, “de facto validity,” as a mechanism for
circumscribing the new rules’ retroactive effect.365 Regarding prospective
effect, the Court reasoned that, whatever the continuing validity of Huson
after Harper and Reynoldsville Casket Co., “there is not the sort of grave
disruption or inequity involved in awarding retrospective relief to this
petitioner that would bring that doctrine into play.”366 The Court
specifically noted that, in addition to Ryder’s case, there were only seven
to ten other cases pending on direct review.367 In Ryder, therefore, the
Court found itself able to grant relief on an Appointments Clause
challenge without unsettling reliance interests or opening any cans of
worms.
The Lucia Court did not have to grapple with adjudicative retroactivity
outright. Lucia argued that the ALJ who charged him with violating the
Investment Advisers Act368 was an “Officer” whose appointment by SEC
staff members, rather than the full commission, violated the Appointments
Clause.369 The Court agreed. In a brief paragraph concluding the opinion,
the Court cited Ryder for the proposition that “one who makes a timely
challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer
who adjudicates his case is entitled to relief.”370 Awarding Lucia a new
hearing, the Court went one step further, requiring that his new hearing be
before a different ALJ.371 The Court did so despite Justice Breyer’s point,
in dissent, that nothing in the constitutional defect compromised the prior
ALJ’s substantive merits decision.372 The Court reasoned that it would not
always have the flexibility to take this additional step—for example,
where there is no alternative decisionmaker to whom a litigant’s case
could be assigned—but it would do so here in order to preserve the
incentive to raise such structural challenges.373
Lucia repeated the Ryder principle that any litigants with pending cases
who had raised a similar challenge would be able to avail themselves of
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
part)).
373.

Id. at 183–84, 184 n.3.
See id.
Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2018).
Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2018).
Id. at 2055 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2055 n.5 (citing id. at 2064 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
Id.
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similar relief.374 Thus, the Court overtly anticipated application of its
standard in other cases. Raymond Lucia’s hearing lasted nine days.375
Lucia’s counsel identified thirteen other pending cases in which litigants
had preserved objections that will likewise require rehearing,376 a number
sufficiently analogous to the number in Ryder to suggest, as Lucia’s
counsel put it, that “the sky [would] not fall” should the Court order
uniform relief.377 However, the SEC, with its 150 affected ALJs, is not the
Social Security Administration (SSA), with its more than 1,600. Although
not all of the 650,000 annual litigants before SSA ALJs will have raised a
Lucia objection, even if some subset have, there will be considerable
dislocation.378 In other words, while Lucia may have been sufficiently
analogous to Ryder in that the hard question of containing the impact of
the Court’s opinion did not arise, the logic of Lucia may compel the Court
to confront very hard questions of far greater disruption in the immediate
future.
For present purposes, it suffices to note a couple of points. First, Ryder,
in its situation-specific mention of the number of affected cases, certainly
left room for the proposition that cases posing greater dislocation and
negative effects may require a different resolution.379 Given only seven to
ten affected cases, the Ryder Court had reason to discount the burden of
according the decision retroactive effect. Lucia, too, with its thirteen
affected cases, may pose little disruption if cabined to the specific context
of SEC ALJs. Although the Court did not spotlight the minimal nature of
the presumed disruption, there is a basis for possible distinction down the
line between the SEC context and other, more disruptive, contexts should
the need arise. In both Ryder and Lucia, the weight on the
disruption/systemic effects side of the balance was trivial indeed.
But more fundamentally, it is critical to look at the other side of the
balance. The Court’s frequent suggestion that the injuries of individual
374. Id. at 2055.
375. Id. at 2049–50.
376. See Brief for Petitioners at 48–49, Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 17-130). The underlying facts
in some of these cases are over a decade old. See, e.g., Timbervest LLC, No. 3-15519 (Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n
Sept.
17,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2015/ia-4197.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WUR-2TU5] (recounting thirteen year old facts and proceedings beginning in 2012),
remanded per curiam, Timbervest LLC v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 15-1416, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 32721
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 2018) (setting aside SEC Commission decision and ordering new hearing before
different ALJ or the Commission in light of Lucia).
377. Brief for Petitioners at 49, Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 17-130).
378. See Morrison, supra note 339 (noting that “even a relative few will be bad news for the
agency”).
379. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995).
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litigants occasioned by Appointments Clause violations are largely
symbolic, and its repeated expression of the need to incentivize litigants,
permits it to group structural challenges into a category of their own.
Litigants called before an improperly appointed tribunal are the best, if
not sole, challengers to the composition of the tribunal. However, the
Court itself has admitted that rarely, if ever, can they show that the results
in their cases would have been different before a properly appointed
decision maker.380 With such modest skin in the game that they require
incentives to raise challenges in the first place, it simply cannot be said
that these litigants would face major injustice were they to lack a remedy
altogether.
Like Fourth Amendment claims seeking exclusion of evidence, then,
the asserted right in this separation-of-powers sphere is one that we confer
upon a litigant for a purpose unrelated to any specific harm encountered
by that litigant.381 In the Fourth Amendment context, the primary
motivation for evidentiary exclusion is deterring law enforcement
misconduct, and the Court has made it quite clear that the successful
litigant is a “windfall” beneficiary.382 The successful Fourth Amendment
litigant obtains a benefit because that is the nature of judicial resolution
under Article III, which abjures advisory opinions. Where the purpose of
deterrence is not advanced, and where the concomitant systemic harm is
large, however, the Court has—both during the Linkletter/Huson regime
and thereafter—found a mechanism to prevent other litigants in the
pipeline from obtaining the benefits of a new rule. In the Appointments
Clause context, too, there is ample room for the Court to strike a similar
balance. The Court can look carefully at the purpose of the rule—
vindicating structural norms, rather than protecting an individual’s right—
and examine whether widespread disruption of retroactive application is
a necessary cost of its advancement. This is not a new exercise, and it is
not “unrelated to” adjudicative retroactivity. Instead, it reflects the precise
balancing that the Court has been undertaking for years, both during the
Linkletter/Huson regime and, it appears, in years since.
CONCLUSION
Having shut down the intricate balancing of the Linkletter/Huson era,
perhaps it is unsurprising that the Court has found it necessary to rely on
other mechanisms for blunting the disruptive impact of novel rules. A
system works when people can rely on rules that govern their primary
380. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
381. Cf. supra note 53 and accompanying text.
382. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 248 (2011).
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conduct. That the Court has absorbed this basic intuition makes sense and
contributes to its institutional legitimacy. What is surprising, though, is
that the Court’s insistence that each of the doctrines it currently deploys
is “independent” and “distinct” and motivated by completely different
considerations does not withstand serious scrutiny. The hodgepodge of
mechanisms currently in play in fact operate largely the same way as they
always have, reflecting an assessment of the interests at stake, the means
by which they are advanced (or thwarted) by retroactive application, and
the concomitant burdens they impose.

